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Book Reviews

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Roger Pearson
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Suicide Terrorism in the Former USSR

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The authors examine the spread of radical Islamic terrorist organizations in the territories of the former USSR, and note in particular the role of suicide bombers and the use of Tajikistan as a haven for such terrorists.

Key Words: Terrorism; Suicide bombers; Islamic fundamentalist movements; Jihad, Al Qaeda; Hizb ut Tahrir; Tajikistan; Uzbekistan; Afghanistan; Chechnya; Russian federation.

Introduction

The expansion of extremist Islam into the former USSR has confused the political situation by working with and sometimes engulfing sundry non-religious anti-establishment organizations. Significant ties between Chechen Islamic fighters and Tajik Islamists encourage the use of suicide terrorism in Central Asian regions of the former Soviet Union. In June 2000, five attacks on Russian military bases and a car bombing in Chechnya introduced Russia to the phenomenon. Two years later, Chechen rebels attacked a Moscow theater, demonstrating the rising Arabic influence within terrorism in the former USSR. The murder of legendary Afghan commander Akhmadshakh Masud in September 2001, the July 2004 attacks on the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Uzbekistan, and the August-September 2004 Chechen suicide attacks brought greater attention to the connection.

Tajikistan is being used as a base to expand terrorist influence into Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia proper. Because of its proximity to Afghanistan, the country has become a haven for terrorists fleeing the consequences of U.S. military operations. Radical Islamic teachers from the Middle East, skillful in developing motivational themes for extremist movements, have joined the influx. Consequently, many Tajiks have

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joined members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in terrorist activities; and Hizb ut Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, has become a destabilizing influence creating a climate conducive to suicide terrorism.

Suicide terrorism presents a new challenge to Western nations that is not compatible with the strategic and tactical military challenges to which they are accustomed. Any evidence of success by suicide bombers makes the tactic more attractive to Islamic terrorist groups, and this enables recruiters to present it as a weapon capable of overcoming the United States and its allies in Central Asia as well as the Russian presence in the north Caucasus.

In the post-Soviet environment, religious sentiment, superstition and prejudice are manipulated as terrorist recruitment techniques. Activity that is fundamentally positive (e.g., the creation of a value system based on religious motivational themes) can be transformed into the basis for criminal behavior that is shrouded in religious rhetoric. Skilled, educated recruiters transform speculation about religious principles and the nature of an afterlife into themes encouraging self-sacrifice. Extremist religious figures persuade sincere believers that death is God's grace and provides accelerated entry into "paradise."

Circumstances that contribute to the mobilization of religious extremist organizations in the former USSR's Islamic regions lend themselves greatly to suicide terrorism. Indeed, for several years, skilled radical Islamic teachers from the Middle East have been relocating to Tajikistan. Given the proper circumstances, suicide terrorism may be effective as a weapon in religious-ethnic conflict, in cases where the religious element overshadows the ethnic, interstate and cultural factors.

The influx of Islamic teachers from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East combines with the work of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan to create favorable conditions for suicide terrorism in the former USSR. There are several existing circumstances that are likely to be exploited by these Islamic teachers. The most significant are:

- In much of Central Asia there is a very low standard of living, making suicide terror tactics cheap and secure.
- Under the cover of humanitarian activities, Al Qaeda representatives began to infiltrate Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,

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Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, and Chechnya as early as 1989. This marked a dramatic increase of foreign extremist Islamic organizations in the region practicing suicide terrorism.[2]

- The necessary theological groundwork has been laid by the highly secretive Islamic Party Hizb ut Tahrir. Its influence spread rapidly into the northern parts of Tajikistan. While not regarded as violent, Hizb ut Tahrir supports the idea that Muslims should be ready to sacrifice their lives to advance religious and political goals. The organization has, therefore, created a cadre of believers who can be identified by radical parties hoping to employ suicide terrorism.
- Terrorist training schools and camps in Afghanistan helped develop terrorist cells in Tajikistan. Before being destroyed by military operations in 2001 and 2002, those schools and camps provided training for many young Tajik refugees. As a result of the large-scale anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, numerous criminal elements trained in Afghanistan relocated to Tajikistan; and, according to Tajik police sources, individuals associated with suicide terrorist training schools took shelter in Tajikistan.[3] Russian sources even believe that IMU leader Juma Namangani, who had been reported dead, remains alive and working in Tajikistan to regroup terrorists.[4] The presence of such individuals in Tajik territory means there is a core of specialists who may destabilize Tajikistan and use it as a base to launch activities elsewhere in Central Asia.

Islamic terrorism does not seem to have any clear-cut framework; no single war or international act is the cause. Diverse terrorist organizations appear to cooperate on occasion to encourage volunteers to die for their respective causes, thereby achieving both groups'

---

[2] Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 5-6.

[3] Interview by Olimov in Dushanbe, 4 March 2002.

[4] Artie McConnell, "Islamic Radicals Regroup in Central Asia", *Eurasia Insight*, 6 July 2002.

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objectives with one act.

Fundamentalist Islam is the unifying element. Islamist suicide bombers do not perceive their act as suicide, but rather as martyrdom on behalf of the community for the glory of God. These manipulative interpretations of religious doctrine transcend borders and ethnic divisions, and influence individuals from a variety of movements. In recent years, the appearance and subsequent increase in female suicide bombers has made it even more difficult to composite a portrait of the typical suicide bomber.

Suicide versus Martyrdom

According to Hanafit Islam, Muslims may declare jihad (in the full religious sense) only on individuals or groups who have threatened their religion, honor, life or territory. In the event of the declaration of jihad, religious teachings encourage any action causing the enemy considerable loss – including the sacrifice of one's life. Should a Muslim lose life in the pursuit of jihad, the deceased is considered "Shahid", i.e. a martyr.

Yet, there are divisions within Islam with varying perspectives on violence and suicide. Islamic endorsement of suicide terrorism depends on the respective sect's distinction between suicide and martyrdom. The Quoran clearly says, "Do not kill yourselves" and warns those who disobey will be "cast into the fire." Yet, many Muslims (though not all) consider self-sacrifice not only legitimate, but highly commendable when undertaken for reasons of jihad. They believe going into war, knowing with certainty one will die, is not suicide (*intihar*) but martyrdom (*istishhad*), a highly praised form of self-sacrifice, done for God, and a way to win the eternal affection of the *houris* in paradise. According to a leading Islamic authority, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, attacks on enemies are not considered suicide, but "heroic martyrdom operations" in which individuals act not "out of hopelessness and despair, but are driven by an overwhelming desire to cast terror and fear into the hearts of the oppressors."[5]

[5] As further clarification of this concept, Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi, secretary-general of the Italian Muslim Association and head of the Cultural Institute of the Italian Islamic Community, and a true Islamic scholar says: "The only ridiculous thing is that someone who claims to be an 'Islamic scholar' makes public declarations which prove beyond any possible

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Tajikistan has been intricately involved in the long-running Afghan crisis, though an analysis of the periodical press of the past decade and interviews with experts indicate that neither of the opposing sides used suicide terrorists during the civil war in Tajikistan. Local politicians cite the practice of Hanafit Islam (which severely condemns suicide) by the Tajik and Uzbek people, the Shariah prohibition of a funeral dirge for a Muslim who has committed suicide and the Hanafit belief that God gives life and only He may take it away as reasons for the absence of suicide terrorism during the conflict.[6]

However, according to non-partisan sources, the people of this region are more likely to be Sunni than Hanafit Muslims. Recent reports indicate that the population of Tajikistan is actually 80% Sunni Muslim.[7] The same distribution is seen throughout most of the region. Uzbekistan, for example, which is 88% Muslim, is also comprised mostly of Sunnis.[8]

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doubt that he has never read the Commentary of Ibn Kathir and 'sunan' of Imam at-Tirmidhi, which are basic books for the knowledge of Islam! Unfortunately, this attribution of chairs to ignoramuses seems to be the rule in American Islamic Centers controlled by the fundamentalist network of the Muslim Brotherhood.

"According to Islam there are seventy two wives for every believer who is admitted to Heaven, and not only for a martyr. The proof is a *hadith* which is collected by Imam at-Tirmidhi in "Sunan" (Volume IV, Chapters on "The Features of Heaven as described by the Messenger of Allah", Chapter 21: "About the Smallest Reward for the People of Heaven", hadith 2687) and also quoted by Ibn Kathir in his Tafsir (Koranic Commentary) of Surah Rhman (55), ayah (verse) 72:

> "It was mentioned by Daraj Ibn Abi Hatim,.that Abu al-Haytham 'Adullah Ibn Wahb narrated from Abu Sa'id al-Khudhri, who heard the Prophet Muhammad (Allah's blessings and peace be upon him) saying, 'The smallest reward for the people of Heaven is an abode where there are eighty thousand servants and seventy two wives, over which stands a dome decorated with pearls, aquamarine and ruby, as wide as the distance from al-Jabiyyah to San'a.
>
> "Ibn Kathir explains in 'al-Bidayah wa an-Nihayah' that al-Jabiyyah is the name of a suburb of Damascus.
>
> "That those seventy two wives are virgin is proved by the ayah 74 of the same Surah: 'No man or jinn has ever touched them before'".

[6] Interview with Sultan Hamad, former press secretary of the UTO leader Mullo Abdullo Nuri, 12 March 2002.

[7] http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ti.html

[8] http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uz.html

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Though the majority of the local population may be Sunnis, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) religious leaders are mainly tradítional Hanafits whose religious dogma does not encourage suicide to achieve religious objectives, including jihad. This explains the absence of suicide terrorism in subversive actions by either side of the Tajik conflict in Tajikistan.

Local sources also credit the absence of suicidal tactics during the conflict to the civil war's origins. Confrontations among the regional elite "over the main collision of the post-Soviet states – division of the state property" were about issues in which suicide tactics would not have been very effective. Therefore, despite the coalescence of political, economic and criminal terrorism in the Central Asia, and in Tajikistan in particular, pragmatic concerns limit the appeal of suicide as a tactic.[9]

The Feminine Face of Suicide Terrorism

Years ago, suicide bombers in Palestine linked the act with a certain demographic profile: "... a young man, probably 18 to 22, not particularly well educated, probably lower economic strata."[10] However, an increasing number of women are becoming involved in terrorist activity, marking a dramatic shift in the nature of terrorism. "The Chechens, who are increasingly connected with Middle Eastern terrorist groups, have learned from the experiences of the Palestinians. Initially, Russia was facing a simpler war in Chechnya. Nowadays it is facing terrorism much more like in the Middle East and linked to international terrorist networks. The biggest difference is that here women have been behind the attacks."[11]

Women were involved in suicide bombings as early as 1985, when Khyadali Sana set off an explosion that killed two Israeli soldiers and wounded two more.[12] However, it was the Chechen siege of a Moscow

[9] M. Olimov. "Problems of Terrorism Combat – The Network of Early Warning and Early Prevention of Conflicts." *Bulletin* No. 20, August 1998, p.66.

[10] Jenkins, Brian. "Female Suicide Bombers: The New Factor in Mideast's Deadly Equation." In an article by Libby Copeland, *Washington Post*, 27 April 2002.

[11] Alexei Malashenko. "Trained by Arabs, 'Black Widows' a Terrifying New Weapon," *The New York Sun*, 10 December 2003.

[12] Beyler, Clara. "Chronology of Suicide Bombings Carried out by Women." International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 12 February 2003.

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theater in October 2002 that marked the growing, intentional inclusion of women in terrorist suicide missions. The world was shocked to find that 18 of the 50 rebels were female. Dressed in the black hijabs and laden with explosive belts, these "black widows" were willing to sacrifice their lives in retaliation for the deaths of fathers, husbands, brothers and sons in the fighting in Chechnya. Since then, women have been involved in at least nine suicide bombings in Chechnya, killing or wounding hundreds of people.

While suicide terrorism is a complex issue encompassing ideological, patriotic and personal motives – *female* suicide terrorism is even more complex. Ironically, although women have not achieved social equality within Islam, particularly within the extremist sects, their participation in suicide missions has elevated them, in death, to heroic status. Female bombers, like their male counterparts, are deemed martyrs.

They willingly choose death, though they are not motivated, like their male counterparts, by the promise of 72 virgins in Paradise. "Suicide bombings have pulled women out of the boxes created by society – the box of a weeping, wailing creature always crying for help... Can anyone say that men are greater patriots than women?"[13]

Female suicide bombers have been involved most dramatically in the on-going Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Even the families of female suicides are sometimes surprised to learn that their daughters, sisters or fiancées have given their own lives in an effort to take those of others. The inclusion of women has changed what was once considered the profile of a suicide bomber.

Yet, there are no concrete demographics supplanting previous profiles, because the women come from various walks of life. In Palestine, a look at four female suicide bombers reveals a high school student, a college student, a seamstress and an ambulance worker.[14]

As diverse as the women are, their motivations for committing these attacks, though intrinsically complex, are often rooted in revenge for

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[13] Ibid. *Haaretz*, 26 May 2003. Article by Arnon Regular.

[14] Copeland, Libby. "Female Suicide Bombers: The New Factor in Mideast's Deadly Equation," *Washington Post*, 27 April 2002.

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personal loss. The loss of family members is a corresponding link between Palestinian and Chechen female suicide bombers, though more apparent in Chechen women, due to the nature of the conflict there. "Of course there is an influence from the Middle East, but the roots of Chechen actions are very different from those of (Osama) bin Laden or Al Qaeda. Their actions are motivated by the fight for independence and, more and more, by the desire for revenge, which runs very deep in the (Chechen) tradition."[15] Therefore, terrorist groups' recruiters lurk within an atmosphere of emotional fervor, and take advantage of personal loss. "...It is well known that Hamas and the Islamic Jihad use funerals and mourning booths as a potential platform for recruitment. These organizations are able to exploit the emotionally loaded circumstances, when feelings of revenge are high."[16]

The use of female suicide bombers is controversial within Islamic terrorist organizations. Col. Sergey Ignatchenko, head of the Federal Security Service's public relations center, believes that the use of women in suicide bombings is "a patent invention of Al Qaeda and other radical groups" in direct contradiction to other Muslim groups.[17] Muslim women often live under codes of conduct requiring permission from a male relative for actions outside the home.[18] That is why many men are surprised to learn of their female relatives' involvement.

For women to find equality in death by waging jihad against the enemy does not afford those remaining greater liberty. Ironically, social constraints drive these women to acts of desperation, in turn making them ideal candidates for exploitation by radical terrorist groups. They are lured to endorse the same mentality they seek to refute. Ironically, Hamas spiritual leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin said women, in some

[15] Alexei Malashenko. "Trained by Arabs, 'Black Widows' a Terrifying New Weapon," *The New York Sun*, 10 December 2003.

[16] Col. (Ret.) Yoni Fighel. Article by Clara Beyler. "Female Suicide Bombers: An Update." International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 7 March 2004.

[17] BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Female Suicide-Bombers Were Trained Abroad – Russian Security Service," ITAR-TASS, 10 December 2003.

[18] Toolis, Kevin. "Why Women Turn To Suicide Bombing?" www.countercurrents.org 13 October 2003.

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instances, require male escorts when waging "jihad and martyrdom."[19]

Some feel terrorists target fanatically-minded women between 16 and 30 years old or abduct women and forcibly train them for suicide missions.[20] But other evidence points to the ready recruitment of willing participants. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has begun public campaigns to indoctrinate women into the mentality of suicide terrorists, holding public demonstrations in honor of those who have committed attacks, airing musical montages depicting the transformation of a woman into a warrior and naming girls' summer camps after well-known female suicide bombers. Indeed, the campaign has been so successful that young girls have appeared in a televised debate, arguing about not *if* but *when* women should commit acts of suicide terrorism.[21]

Islam's Suicidal Tendencies in the Post-Soviet Context

Suicide terrorism assumed great prominence in the former USSR on September 9, 2001, with the murder of legendary Afghan commander Akhmadshah Masud. He was killed by suicide terrorists in Hoja Bahouddin Kishlak in Takhor Province (ISA) of the Republic of Tajikistan, becoming part of a long list of political assassinations in the post-Soviet region of the Asian continent. Previously, suicide terrorism had primarily been a phenomenon associated with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. But the murder of Akhmadshah Masud, in addition to the political ramifications, was significant as Islamic violence against other Muslims.

Russia's first experience with suicide terrorism happened during bloody conflicts in the Caucasus. A suicide car bombing on June 7, 2000, near the Chechen capital Grozny killed two Russian special police. Afterwards, suicide terrorism became more routine in the Chechen conflict. A large group of male and female Chechens took their fight into non-Islamic Russia on October 23, 2002, with the dramatic seizure

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[19] Copeland, Libby. "Female Suicide Bombers: The New Factor in Mideast's Deadly Equation," *Washington Post*, 27 April 2002.

[20] BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Female Suicide-Bombers Were Trained Abroad – Russian Security Service," ITAR-TASS, 10 December 2003.

[21] Marcus, Itamar. "Promoting Women Terrorists," *Palestinian Media Watch*. October 9, 2003,

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of a Moscow theater, holding 800 cast members and theater patrons hostage.

The terrorists carried banners written in Arabic; and the women, who were dressed in Arabic fashion, wore bomb-laden belts. All of the Chechens were killed, along with 120 of the hostages, when Russian security forces stormed the building. Then, in July 2003, suicide bombers struck during a Moscow rock festival, killing 15 people and the two female terrorists. On December 9 of the same year, another suicide bomber killed at least five people in central Moscow.[22]

Suicide terrorism has been even more common in post-Soviet Central Asia where 20 people were killed in Tashkent during an attack aimed at President Karimov of Uzbekistan. Fighting took place throughout the city, and several buildings were destroyed as police attempted to eliminate the terrorists' support network. Recently, the violence intensified when suicide terrorists killed 19 people.[23] Suicide bombers struck again in July 2004 with attacks against several Tashkent targets, including the U.S. Embassy, where two people died.[24]

Psychological, Religious, Social and Other Factors

In the decade following the collapse of the USSR, numerous social, economic, and political challenges arose – all contributing to the emergence of routine violence in the region. In Tajikistan the situation was further complicated by the long, costly civil war, the country's paralysis of power, the collapse of law and order, and a severe weakening of the educational, health care and social protection systems. Currently, a high level of poverty ($178.50 GDP per capita), unemployment (over 30%), and low salaries contribute to the problems.[25] While the economy has dwindled, drug manufacturing and trafficking have consistently increased.

The influx of refugees to the cities as a result of the civil war, the rural and urban migration, and labor migration have led to huge

[22] "Terrorism in Russia," *CNN World Timeline*, 6 February 2004.

[23] Shamil Baigin, "Uzbek Police Storm Militant Hideout; Up to 23 Dead," *Reuters*, 30 March 2004.

[24] Statement by the US Embassy in Tashkent, 6 August 2004.

[25] UNDP Tajikistan. *Human Development Report* 2000, pp. 9, 98.

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displacements of the population inside and outside the country, contributing to the emergence of economic ghettos inhabited by the rural migrants. These conditions explain the rapid marginalization of large sections of the population. These are people who have lost status, income sources, ideals and life prospects. These segments of the population have increased susceptibility to recruitment into terrorist organizations.

In the opinion of Tajik specialists on terrorism,[26] those who risk death in battle or in a futile operation share several characteristics.

a) Generally between 15 and 25 years old;

b) Most take drugs supplied by their commanders;

c) Marginal people who lost or did not have families, or who lost support of friends and relatives. Generally they do not have social status or prospects in life. Very often have no occupation and limited education;

d) Disproportionately the children of refugees or individuals who lived in refugee camps during childhood;

e) Often distinguished by irrational thinking, not with logical reasoning but with images and analogies. They behave as if they identify themselves with characters from the Quoran, and Hadisic myths and legends. These idealized images are real for them and, moreover, they feel themselves the embodiments of such characters;

f) Easily convinced. In terrorist training camps much attention is paid to indoctrination and psychological influence similar to the methods used by totalitarian sects.

According to Tajik analysts, terrorist groups – whether concentrating on terrorism as a whole or, specifically, on suicide terrorism – act within nationalist and religious ideologies. Occasionally, individuals assassinate for personal reasons, but still portray their actions as those of committed Islamic zealots.

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[26] Olimov interview with Sultan Hamad, on 12 March 2002 and with Masrur Mirzoev, former head of the Defense Ministry Intelligence Department, on 6 April 2002 in Dushanbe.

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The attack on the Moscow Theater is one of the most highly publicized events illustrating the growing reality of suicide terrorism in the FSU. The Islamic regions of the former USSR have suffered most from suicide terrorism. In July 2002, Russian convoys in Chechnya were targeted in a series of five coordinated suicide assaults. In one day, 200 Russians were killed or seriously wounded during these attacks. As noted above, these are not isolated events.[27]

Islamic influence has assumed a leading role in the value system of Tajik youth since the collapse of the USSR's communist system.[28] Religious consciousness has significantly increased in the area over recent years as a determinant of personal values and a motivational factor. Recent research shows the overwhelming majority of Tajik youth view Islam as a basis for individual morality and ideology as well as a cultural paradigm for all social behavior.

Suicide terrorism and suicide *per se* are not derived from the same motivations. Suicide among youth is based on a host of personal issues, often feelings of worthlessness toward the community. Suicide terrorists, by contrast, see themselves in heroic terms, acting on behalf of the community to destroy enemies. Thus, impoverished youth are not drawn to suicide terrorism as a desperate expression of self-annihilation. The reality of the situation, according to a British journalist who studied terrorist tactics, is "suicide bombing thrives because of a specific political culture that deliberately fosters and uses it. The bomber is not behaving irrationally but commits his act in the clear expectation of returns."[29] Therefore, terrorist organizations need only develop an apparatus for transforming the religious zeal and economic despair of Central Asian youth into a focused terrorist impulse.

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[27] "Chechnya's Suicide Bombings: The Worst Is Yet To Come," *Central Asia Caucasus Analyst* (Johns Hopkins University), 19 July 2000.

[28] "Governance, Youth Values and Life Styles in Central Asian Countries," Vol. 2. Tajikistan. UESCO, MOST Program, SHARQ Scientific Analytical Centre, Ijtimoiy Fikr Public Opinion Study center, 2001, pp. 94-95.

[29] Jenny McCartney, "Suicide bombing is not a misguided career choice," London, *Daily Telegraph*, 28 June 2002.

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The Chechen Connection

Suicide terrorism is not limited by national boundaries. There are significant Tajik connections to conflict in other parts of the former USSR, specifically in Chechnya, where suicide tactics have already been used. Furthermore, the close relationship between the events in Afghanistan and the Tajik civil war increase the likelihood of suicide terrorism being used in Afghanistan. Unusually large numbers of Central Asians have already joined Chechens in Al Qaeda's notorious Brigade 055.[30]

There have been indications of cooperation between terrorists in Tajikistan and Chechnya. In Tajikistan, there are reports of an Islamic school in Grozny having trained young individuals for suicide missions long before suicide terrorism attracted global attention. According to published reports, training was intended to prepare suicide terrorists for the destruction of military assets.[31] According to Nikolas Gvosdev, the editor of Russia's National Interest magazine, "there have always been connections between the separatists in Chechnya, al-Qaeda, and other elements of the international Islamist movement". This does not, according to Gvosdev, mean that outsiders – whether Tajiks or Osama bin Laden himself – order incidents of terrorism in Russia but rather that there is a consistent "exchange of personnel" between these movements.[32]

Early in 2001, there was reportedly a meeting in the Kofarnikhonsky District of Tajikistan between unidentified Tajiks, representatives of the Chechen mujahidin, the well-known terrorist Khattab – who fought in Afghanistan and Tajikistan before moving to Chechnya – and members of the Taliban. The meeting was mainly to explore the prospects for political, ideological, and military cooperation. Prior to the meeting, Chechens had recruited 60 ethnic Tajiks for combat operations in Chechnya. Each recruit was supplied with a new Russian passport to facilitate travel from Tajikistan to Chechnya. The group traveled from

[30] Gunaratna, p. 135.

[31] "In Chechnya They are Training Children as Suicide Terrorists", *Vechernyy Dushanbe*, 29 October 1999.

[32] Radio Moscow, 6 June 2003.

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Kazakhstan (Aktay) to Baku, through Georgia, and arrived in Chechnya via a terrorist-operated route.[33]

The same terrorist networks have also been effective in channeling funds to the mercenaries who fight Russian forces in Chechnya. In 2003, a Russian journalist interviewed a former terrorist courier who divulged that funds for the terrorists were collected and laundered in Muslim-owned shops around Paris. The proceeds of organized crime as well as donations to Islamic charitable organizations were transported as cash along well-organized routes into Chechnya via Italy, the Balkans and neighboring republics.[34]

Chechen capabilities were dramatically demonstrated in July 2000 when suicide terrorists simultaneously killed scores of Russian soldiers, officers and militiamen. According to the Russian Ministry of Interior, the attacks took place at approximately 8:00 p.m. when terrorists trained in Jordanian camps drove and then detonated ten trucks equipped with explosives under the direction of Chechen guerrilla leader Khattab, whose soldiers were attempting to seize the Chechen city of Gudermes. This incident followed Chechen fighter, and radical Muslim leader, Shamil Bassaev's declaration that he would establish special units of suicide terrorists in response to military operations in Daghestan. After the declaration, a unit comprised of 400 men was operational by September 1999.[35]

Chechen involvement was also suspected in the sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk. The Dagestani Shura boasted a week after the sinking that Dagestani martyrs had used a torpedo to destroy the submarine. Khattab's support of the claim and Basayev's history of involvement in nuclear threats encouraged acceptance of this assertion. While the precise circumstances of the Kursk disaster have long been in dispute, three Dagestanis were in the Kursk's bow compartment at the time of the explosion and the torpedoes stored there were manufactured at the Dagdizel torpedo factory in Dagestan.[36]

[33] *Asia-Plus* (Dushanbe), 2 November 2001.

[34] RTR Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian, 21 December 2003.

[35] Ibid.

[36] John C. K. Daly, "The Kursk Explosion: A Result of Dagestani Sabotage?" Central Asia Caucasus Analyst (Johns Hopkins University), 25 October 2000.

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Though terrorism specialists in the North Caucasus generally dismiss the radical Chechen claim, there are factors that support the theory of Chechen involvement.[37] Chechen guerrillas have radicalized the Islamic communities in the North Caucasus region, and their involvement with Tajiks and Afghanis indicates their regional role. In addition, many Dagestanis have joined the fight for independence from Russia. Also, the attack occurred at a time when Russia, hoping a submarine force would elevate its international military prestige, stood to suffer greatly by this loss.

The past two years brought an intensification of suicide terrorism associated with Chechnya. In May, 2003, a woman named Shakida Baimuradova detonated explosives on her body in an attempt to kill Akhmad Kadyrov, the head of the pro-Moscow Chechen government. While Kadyrov was not hurt, fourteen innocent by-standers did die. Later that same week, suicide bombers attacked a Russian government compound in Znamenskoye with an explosives-laden truck and killed fifty-nine people.[38]

August, 2004 marked the beginning one of the most violent times on record in Russia's struggle with Chechen suicide terrorists. On 24 August, two Russian Tu-154 civilian flights were brought down by hexogen, a powerful explosive used in the 1999 apartment complex bombings. Within days Russian police had evidence that women traveling on Chechen passports acted as suicide terrorists on each flight.[39] One week later a female suicide bomber set off a bomb at a subway entrance in Moscow, killing ten people. She had apparently attempted to go into the subway where more people would have died but was stopped by security police.[40] Even more dramatic was the seizure of an elementary school in Belsan, a small town in North Ossetia, one of Chechnya's north Caucasus neighbors. On the first day of school, over a dozen terrorists who were equipped with suicide-bomb

[37] A series of interviews conducted by William R. Nelson Institute personnel in Vladikavkaz in March 2002 and during the Institute's conference on post-Soviet terrorism held in Moldova in September 2001.

[38] Moscow News, 6 June 2003.

[39] "Explosives Found in Russian Jet Wreckage", Associated Press, 27 August 2004.

[40] "Terror Related Incident in Russia", Associated Press, 1 September 2004.

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belts took control of the school and held hundreds of students and their parents as hostages, demanding the release of Chechen terrorists held by Russian authorities.[41] Bombs controlled by the terrorists were detonated and the size of the subsequent death roll amongst both students and parents, which exceeded 300, shocked not only Russia but the entire Western world.

Use of Suicide Terror Tactics by Islamic Fundamentalists

In the Tajik civil war, many UTO supporters realized they might be killed in combat – but hoped to reach paradise. There were no documented cases of opposition fighters assuming the role of suicide terrorist, although the UTO forces were trained in suicide tactics. A former associate of UTO field commander Rizvon Sadirov (who was eventually expelled from the UTO) provided such training to his troops. Sadirov, who at one time worked with Akhmadshah Masud, entered Tajikistan illegally by way of Afghanistan and conducted suicide training courses for Central Asian terrorists. Later, while in Tajikistan, in November 1997, Sadirov's group took two French nationals hostage. As police attempted a rescue, one of the suicide terrorists held a hostage in one hand and exploded a grenade in the other. Both the terrorist and the hostage died.[42]

Instances of suicide terrorism, like the motivation for it, vary. For example, soon after the Tajik peace accord was established in 1997, there were several explosions in Dushanbe. Since the terrorists apparently died in the bomb blasts, according to Tajik criminal investigators, their deaths were considered intentional and as suicide terrorism.

Similarly, Tajik officials consider the death of J. Isaev an instance of suicide terrorism.[43] When Tajik criminal investigators apprehended Isaev, a particularly dangerous young criminal, he killed himself with a hand grenade. Suspected of committing terrorist acts in Dushanbe and

[41] Musa Sadulayev, "Hundreds Held in Russian School; 8 Killed", Associated Press, 1 Sept., 2004. " N. Kralev, Russia vows pre-emptive terror strikes," *Washington Times*, Sept. 9, 2004

[42] Interview by contributing author Olimov with former associate of Rizvon Sadirov, Dushanbe, 12 March 2002.

[43] *The Orient Express* (Dushanbe), 3 February 2001.

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elsewhere in Tajikistan, he had gained notoriety in 1999 for his role in murdering the director of the Ministry of Interior press office.

Another incident that local authorities describe as suicide terrorism took place on April 5, 2001, when the trading center of the former "Detsky Mir" building in Dushanbe exploded. According to Tajikistan's First Deputy Security Minister, Mukhtor Sharipov, police investigators determined the terrorist was holding the explosive device in his hands. The bomb was extremely powerful, employing substances previously associated with terrorist acts in Central Asia. While cynics speculated the terrorist might have simply been incompetent, Security Minister Sharipov argued that the individual set out to kill himself as part of a deadly symbolic gesture.[44]

Another incident occurred the day Akhmadshah Masud was killed (September 9, 2001) when a terrorist, Gaffor Abdulgafforov, killed himself with a homemade explosive during a ceremony celebrating Tajikstan's national independence. The Tajik resident of Dushanbe, known in terrorist circles as "Hamza" and believed to have been associated with the Taliban, managed to get to Somoni Street, near Putovsky Memorial, close to the site of the celebration taking place at Frunze stadium in Dushanbe. Police concluded the terrorist, who was wearing the bomb in a belt, intended to enter the stadium where a large audience, the president and other senior officials of the Tajik government were gathered.[45]

Though no additional information was made public, local political observers connected this incident with the murder of Akhmadshah Masud and the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States. The terrorists' Taliban connections and Al Qaeda activities in Dushanbe, combined with Tajikistan's assistance to Akhmadshah Masud in his fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, led to the conclusion that the Tajik president was the intended victim of the abortive attack.

Extensive coverage on terrorism and suicide terrorism in the Tajik republican press indicates that secular authorities and the Islamic establishment are alarmed at the prospect of increased future incidence

[44] "The Terrorist Blew Himself Up", Asia-*Plus*, 4 December 2001.

[45] *Krim-Info* (Dushanbe), 14 September 2001.

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in Tajikistan. Muslims, such as the PIVT leader Muhammafsharif Himmatzoda, have expressed strong opposition to suicide terrorism and complained bitterly about such activities being characterized as "Islamic."[46]

Conclusion

If suicide terrorism proves effective in changing the strategic military equation with regard to secular authority, it will gain popularity with Islamic extremist groups in the former USSR and Central Asian states. Radical Islamic teachers have paved the way for the creation of a climate conducive to such activities by training a core of acolytes who believe that Islam advocates suicide under certain circumstances.

Complicating the situation, women have begun to play a more active role in suicide terrorism.

Terrorists' activity in Tajikistan is significant and strengthened by involvement in Afghanistan, cooperation with radical Chechen forces, and provision of a safe haven for terrorists who fled from Afghanistan in the wake of successful anti-terrorist military operations. The situation poses increasing cause for concern in the West as suicide terrorism tactics expose means of overcoming traditional security efforts.

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[46] M. Himmatzoda, *In Search of the Truth*, Dushanbe, 2001, p. 72.

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The Quest for Fiscal Discipline Among European Union Member States

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The authors examine the history of efforts to introduce fiscal discipline amongst the member countries of the European Union, both before and after the Stability and Growth Pact, and make recommendations as to issues that must be considered with regard to any measures taken to modify the provisions of the Pact.

Key Words: European Union; European Council; European Central Bank; European Council for Social and Economic Affairs; EU Stability and Growth Pact; Maastricht Treaty; Fiscal Discipline.

While the euro area's monetary policy is conducted by a single institution – the European Central Bank (ECB) – fiscal policy remains decentralized. When Europe's leaders agreed to form the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1989, they recognized the need for some form of fiscal coordination. Without coordination, the irresponsible policies of one member state could have a negative impact on the entire union, for example, by raising public debt. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), setting out regulations for the conduct of fiscal policy that reinforce the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, was therefore agreed to by member states in 1997, nearly two years before stage three of the EMU, when exchange rates were locked together.

The SGP consists of two regulations and a resolution agreed by the European Council to underpin the fiscal framework of the Maastricht Treaty. It combines discipline and flexibility by requiring countries to reach fiscal positions "close to balance or in surplus" over the medium term (a reference to the underlying or structural fiscal position) and keep their actual deficits below 3 percent of GDP, except in the case of unusually large shocks. Member states submit annual plans – for public finances over the medium term. The Council offers opinions on them and, if necessary, delivers early warnings. Unless exceptional circumstances apply, the excessive-deficit procedure is initiated when a country's deficit exceeds 3 percent of GDR. The procedure starts with a

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recommendation to reduce the deficit, moves on to enhanced fiscal surveillance, and culminates in the imposition of financial sanctions. If no action is taken along the way, sanctions can be imposed within 10 months of the procedure being initiated. If excessive deficits persist, sanctions can be converted into fines after two years.

But seven years later, the SGP is mired in controversy. France and Germany – the euro area's largest economies, founding members of the European Union (EU), and the main driving force behind the creation of EMU – are likely to breach the pact's deficit ceiling of 3 percent of GDP for the third year in a row. In November 2003, the European Commission – the official guardian of the EU's treaties – recommended that both France and Germany be placed under enhanced fiscal surveillance, one step short of actual sanctions. However, the Council of Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN) – the decision-making forum for the EU's ministers of finance and economics – suspended the excessive-deficit procedures against the two countries, effectively sidestepping the SGP's rules and leaving the pact in a legal limbo. As it was unclear by what authority the Council acted when it decided not to take action, the European Commission took the case to the European Court of Justice.

Not surprisingly, the SGP is increasingly becoming a lightning rod for pundits debating its economic and political merits. Critics argue that besides being hard to enforce, the pact promotes procyclical fiscal policies (that is, it forces countries to reduce deficits during cyclical downturns) and lacks a rationale for its medium-term goal of bringing the underlying fiscal deficit close to balance or into surplus. Supporters, however, think the pact should be credited with controlling Europe's fiscal deficits. They also point to the countercyclical behavior of fiscal deficits since the introduction of the euro and note that most member countries have managed to live up to their commitments under the pact. Proposed solutions and blueprints abound, ranging from minor tinkering to completely rewriting the pact. This article tries to shed light on the controversy by reviewing the history of Europe's fiscal policy before and after the pact. It concludes with some thoughts on possible reforms.

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Europe's Fiscal Past

Prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, fiscal policies in EU member countries were widely divergent. Some countries ran large and persistent deficits that fed into rapid public debt accumulation, while others preserved remarkable degree of fiscal discipline. By the early 1990s, gross public debts in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, and Italy had spiraled to over 100 percent of GDP, with fiscal policies on a clearly unsustainable path. At the other end of the spectrum, public debt accumulation in Germany and France was kept well in check. Given many prospective EMU members' apparent inability to maintain fiscal discipline, Germany, in particular, insisted on a common fiscal framework to rein in the spending of profligate countries before the euro was allowed to replace national currencies.

Thinking inside the box

The ideal fiscal rule (quadrant A) enables a country to achieve fiscal discipline over the medium term while allowing enough flexibility to smooth business cycle fluctuations over the short term.

Short-term fiscal flexibility	Medium-term fiscal discipline: Yes	Medium-term fiscal discipline: No
Yes	A: Ideal fiscal framework	B: Countercyclical but anchorless fiscal framework
No	C: Overly rigid, procyclical fiscal framework	D: Poor fiscal framework, policy drift

These deliberations resulted in two key provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, which state that fiscal deficits should be kept below 3 percent of GDP and debt ratios should not exceed 60 percent. To ensure compliance, member countries also agreed on a preventive arm focused on multilateral surveillance and a dissuasive arm for addressing "excessive deficits." The SGP was agreed nearly two years before stage three of EMU and provides more detailed guidance on implementing the Maastricht provisions on fiscal discipline .

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One way to understand what the SGP was designed to do is to look at a matrix on fiscal discipline and flexibility – the two key objectives of a successful fiscal policy rule. Even though fiscal policy frameworks differ widely across countries, they can be evaluated using the same two criteria: Is the policy framework capable of ensuring medium-term fiscal discipline? Is it flexible enough to help smooth short-term business cycle fluctuations? These two criteria suggest a broad four-way classification of policy outcomes (see Box 1).

The upper left quadrant (A) illustrates "fiscal nirvana" – the outcome most prized and hoped for by architects of fiscal policy rules – delivering both medium-term discipline and short-term flexibility. The lower right quadrant (D) depicts the worst possible fiscal policy outcome, namely, a lack of both discipline and flexibility. The two other quadrants (B and C) contain the mixed cases, with the lower left quadrant (C) illustrating what is probably a fairly common occurrence: a policy framework that delivers fiscal discipline but does not help stabilize the economy.

Supporters of the SGP argue that the pact, in principle, allows countries to occupy quadrant A on the grounds that underlying (or structural) balance provides a large enough cushion to allow automatic stabilizers to operate fully without normally breaching the 3 percent limit. Furthermore, the requirement of keeping the underlying budget position close to balance or in surplus is justified, they say, by fiscal sustain – ability considerations – including future expectations of large fiscal costs related to aging. However, critics question the concept of underlying balance, which they say is unrelated to the fundamental issue of fiscal sustainability. They also say there is no economic rationale for the debt ratio to converge (in theory at least) toward zero. Moreover, they argue, the pact would, at best, nudge fiscal policy into the less-than-ideal quadrant C, as the fixation on nominal balances constrains fiscal policy flexibility.

But what was the starting point for Europe? While the pre-EMU record on fiscal discipline across countries was mixed, there is considerable evidence that most EU countries ran highly precyclical fiscal policies during the 1960s and 1970s (deficits during the latter period represented to some degree efforts to meet the 3 per cent deficit limit by

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1997). In particular, the estimated discretionary fiscal response of the general government balance to output growth was negative for all EU countries, bar the Scandinavian ones. In four countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Italy), policy proclicality was large enough to more than fully offset the automatic fiscal stabilizers. Procyclical fiscal leakages were particularly severe during "good times," when high growth softens fiscal constraints. In sum, most countries occupied quadrants C and D of the discipline-flexibility taxonomy. In fact, some of the countries with the most procyclical policies were also those with the least fiscal discipline, landing them squarely in quadrant D – reflecting the worst possible outcome for fiscal policy. Other countries gravitated toward quadrant C, given that maintaining fiscal discipline in no way guaranteed short-run fiscal flexibility with respect to the cycle.

Assessing the Pact's Performance

Given the dismal historical starting points of most member countries, it is hard to see how the pact would not have improved fiscal policy behavior. In its design, the SGP clearly puts the emphasis on maintaining fiscal discipline. Thus, combining discipline with anticyclical flexibility in the short run would require a significant measure of forward-looking fiscal policy management, particularly by allowing fiscal stabilizers to operate during good times.

So what does the track record of the pact over the past five years show? By the time the euro was introduced in 1999, all 12 euro area countries had succeeded in reducing their deficits to below 3 percent of GDR A good one-third of the countries were running surpluses, including some that had a history of high public debt accumulation. Nevertheless, initial fiscal positions in most countries were not in line with the pact's requirement that fiscal positions be close to balance or in surplus over the medium term – something that did not augur well for the future.

But despite worries about the short-term nature of measures implemented by some member countries to comply with the deficit ceiling, the pact proved conducive to fiscal discipline – at least generally speaking. Looking at the big picture, the average euro area deficit during the euro's first five years stood a full 3 percentage points lower

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than the prepact average from 1980 onward. Indeed, from a sustainability perspective, the euro area's fiscal position over the past few years compares favorably with that of other major currency areas. At under 3 percent of GDP, the area's structural fiscal deficit in 2003 was less than half that of the United States and less than one-fourth of Japan's.

In another major turnaround of policy behavior, the pact also caused fiscal policy to become distinctly less procyclical in most, if not all, euro area countries. Looking at the most recent business cycle (1999-2003), the structural fiscal balance of the euro area barely budged while fiscal deficits increased, as automatic fiscal stabilizers were generally allowed to operate unhindered.

Also during this period, however, a gulf emerged between large and small countries. While the structural balance improved by more than 1 percent of GDP in the nine small countries, it deteriorated by roughly the same amount in the three large countries. In particular, Italy, France, and Germany allowed their underlying fiscal positions to slip during the slowdown, starting from an already unfavorable level in 1999. In contrast, the small countries, as a group, continued to consolidate during the slowdown. In sum, the pact seems to have worked well for countries that found external commitments to be a valuable disciplining device. As a result, a new dichotomy replaced the old high debt-low debt nexus: with the large countries seemingly unwilling to push for underlying balance, the small countries seized the mantle of fiscal rectitude by sticking to their commitments under the pact. Even more ironically, France and Germany – the traditional bastions of fiscal stability in the prepact era – together with Portugal became the first test cases for the pact's excessive-deficit procedure.

So the pact did unquestionably deliver a high – but certainly not perfect – degree of fiscal flexibility during the downturn. On the issue of fiscal discipline, the track record is more mixed. Clearly, none of the euro area's member countries reverted to the lack of fiscal discipline prevalent before the pact. At least from a historical perspective, therefore, one could argue that under the pact's influence most countries seem to be gravitating toward quadrant A. By the pact's own standards of fiscal discipline, however, much remains to be done before quadrant A "membership" can be certified. In particular, several

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countries – including the largest – failed to reach "secure" underlying positions before the slowdown began and, in addition, allowed their structural deficits to slip further during the downturn. With automatic stabilizers largely allowed to operate, the resulting fiscal outcomes were repeated breaches of the 3 percent deficit limit by these countries. Moreover, most of the high-debt countries – the "original sinners" that provided the main impetus for having a pact in the first place – made only limited progress in bringing debt levels in line with the treaty's 60 percent of GDP reference value.

Problems of Enforcement

The application of the SGP's enforcement procedures has certainly not been smooth. When Portugal and Germany looked set to exceed the deficit limit in early 2002, ECOFIN refrained from issuing early warnings despite calls to do so from the Commission. Both countries ended up breaching the 3 percent limit, in 2001 and 2002, respectively. But when France exceeded the limit in January 2003, it did receive a warning. ECOFIN also acknowledged excessive deficits in Portugal in November 2002, Germany in January 2003, and France in June 2003.

Countries reacted in different ways to ECOFIN's warnings. Portugal succeeded in reducing its deficit to under 3 percent in 2002 and 2003. France and Germany both failed to do the same. And while ECOFIN acknowledged in June 2003 that Germany had taken measures worth 1 percent of GDP, it soon became clear that the excessive deficit would persist in 2004. Likewise, France made little headway, and its deficit is now also expected to persist for the third consecutive year.

Against this background, the pact's procedural machinery broke down in November 2003. Citing France's and Germany's failure to curb excessive deficits, the Commission recommended stepping up the pressure. First, the countries would be requested to reduce their cyclically adjusted deficits in 2004 – by 1 percent of GDP for France and by 0.8 percent of GDP for Germany. Second, recognizing adverse economic circumstances, the Commission proposed giving the two countries an extra year (until 2005) to eliminate their excessive deficits. Third, the countries would be placed under enhanced fiscal surveillance and required to submit regular progress reports. But ECOFIN did not

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endorse this strategy. Instead, while agreeing with the Commission on the need to eliminate the excessive deficits by 2005, it effectively suspended the legal framework.

The differences between the Commission and ECOFIN on what constitutes a desirable fiscal policy are not significant. Indeed, ECOFIN could have altered the size of the adjustment or the time frame needed to eliminate the excessive deficit – all the while remaining within the legal framework. But, by failing to take action within the framework, it induced the Commission to ask the European Court of Justice to rule on the matter.

What Next?

Given this mixed track record, what should happen to the pact? Should the limits on fiscal deficits and debt simply be dropped, as some have argued? With the euro area facing a serious fiscal sustainability problem, its strong preference for a welfare state ring-fenced by strict financial discipline is understandable. In this light, the medium- to long-term dimensions of the pact fulfill a valid function that is generally accepted by member states. Looking back, the experience with rapid public debt accumulation in some member countries reinforces the need for strict limits on fiscal deficits and debt. Looking to the future, maintaining fiscal discipline will be even more important, given the enormous unfunded liabilities associated with aging populations in most member countries. Finally, a framework emphasizing fiscal discipline would also prove particularly valuable to the ten new member states that joined the EU on May 1 – some of which are burdened by high current transfers and widening fiscal deficits that, if unchecked, will dampen long-term growth prospects. While these factors speak against relaxing the main parameters of the Maastricht Treaty, the pact should be politically credible and economically meaningful. In this regard, potential reforms to the SGP could usefully be evaluated against three criteria. First, reforms should reduce the chances that countries with strong and proven domestic fiscal governance structures get entangled in protracted excessive-deficit procedures that quickly lead to sanctions. Second, reforms should help push higher-debt countries toward adopting stronger fiscal adjustment strategies. And, third, given that a

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significant number of countries have already aligned their fiscal policies with the SGP, potential reforms should preserve the incentives to maintain fiscal discipline. In the light of these criteria, a reform strategy could focus on the following planks:

- *More emphasis on symmetric implementation of the SGP during good times*, which means beefing up the pact's preventive arm. Had France and Germany attained "close to balance or in surplus" positions during the upswing (1999-2000), as did several of the other euro area countries, their fiscal positions might not have triggered the excessive-deficit procedure. Specific measures to this end would include developing better measures of structural balance, encouraging "rainy day funds," and replacing pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financing mechanisms with prefunding or more tax smoothing. Early enforcement could also be encouraged by using "national watchdog" institutions that can exercise moral suasion over their governments' fiscal policy behavior.
- *A less rigid procedure for dealing with excessive deficits* so that it is easier to distinguish between patent fiscal policy misbehavior and deficit overshoots that result from protracted weak growth. Although the SGP already has significant built-in procedural flexibility, its dissuasive arm could be softened, for example, by relaxing the rather strict conditions in which "exceptional circumstances" apply.
- *A stronger role for fiscal sustainability considerations.* Flexibility should also be enhanced at the preventive stage by including country-specific sustainability issues in determining the numerical targets for the "close to balance or in surplus" condition. This would imply a greater role for initial debt levels, as well as implicit pension liabilities.

For Europe, the challenge ahead will be to find a better balance between enforcing discipline and allowing flexibility. To do this, the pact may have to evolve further. In particular, for the sake of the pact's credibility, the present procedural impasse needs to be resolved quickly. Otherwise, some of the smaller member countries, aggrieved by what

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they perceive as double standards, might be less inclined to respect the pact in the future – and there are early signs that this is already occurring. However, it is also clear that there are limits on how far reforms can go in practice, given that 25 member states will have to agree on any reform package.

This paper is a shortened version of an article by the same authors which appeared in the June 2004 issue of *Finance and Development* under the title *Europe's Quest for Fiscal Discipline*.

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Communal Values, Cultural Identity and the Challenge of Development in Contemporary Africa

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Given the urgency to transcend its image as a "dark continent," every African should be concerned about the need to arrest the level of disorder which has made corruption and ethnic warfare the trade mark of most African states. The problem of African development has been traced among other factors to political instability, economic crises, societal breakdown, demographic pressures, Christian, Moslem and pagan religious conflicts, and the incompatible ethnic configuration of African states due to amalgamation of diverse tribal and ethnic groups within political borders established under colonial rule. We therefore argue that the traditional African emphasis on communal values needs to be reinvigorated while remembering that African leaders need to be more ready to adopt new values and ideas such as will promote future development.

Key Words: Africa; Societal breakdown; Corruption; Communal values; Personal identity; Economic development.

Africa's Developmental Crisis

In the last four decades, African scholars have identified various factors responsible for the present state of underdevelopment of Africa, but the level of underdevelopment of Africa still defies rational explanation given the abundant human and material resources with which Africa is endowed. The widespread poverty, malnutrition and disease as exemplified in the HIV/ AIDS pandemic, malaria fever and other killer diseases has been linked to the prevalent level of corruption in most African states. For example:

> When Nigeria's president Sani Abacha died, he left behind an oil-flush nation where few of the proceeds seem to trickle down to the people and where gasoline shortages are crippling daily life (*Time*, 1998:20).

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In similar vein:

> The world champion grafter had to be Zairean dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. Until his overthrow ... he has plundered his country's treasury to the extent of perhaps more than $1 billion during the 32 years he ruled and bankrupted his country (*Ibid.*)

Although no society is insulated from corruption, the dimension it has taken in most African states, especially on the part of leadership, has frustrated development. Of course, corruption is not to be treated as a cause of its own, it is also in part the result of certain cultural and structural imbalances among African nation states involving factors such as multi-ethnicity, injustice, marginalization and the concept of the state as an entity to be milked dry. This is aptly captured in Peter Ekeh's (1975' 1980) analysis of 'two cultures and two publics' in which the public servant exhibits a double morality when it comes probity. His fellow tribesmen would see a public servant who defrauds the state as a hero, but a public servant who defrauded his tribal community would be treated as an outcast.

This trend has even acquired an even more frightening dimension today. According to Ade Ajayi (1999:16), the urban, political elite of Africa has alienated itself from its own people such that in those African states which purport to maintain a measure of representative government, the political leaders only go to their supporters during election when they need votes. It is a pathetic picture:

> The elite, like the colonial state, which they inherited, has grown apart from the society. Increasingly the state and the elite who control the state, have become predators of the society.(*Ibid.*).

The Problem of Multi-Ethnic States

In the period following World War II, hasty decolonization created artificial multi-ethnic states when independence was granted to the former colonial territories without any attempt to tailor the new states in accordance with ethnic and cultural realities. Indeed, because the boundaries of the new African states merely reflected the borders of the former colonial territories, few of today's African states represent homogenous ethnic or cultural entities. The result has been a legacy of

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widespread conflicts often amounting to civil war, when smaller ethnic entities attempt to free themselves from domination by more powerful groups.

Although this problem could theoretically be solved by redrawing political boundaries, several scholars have suggested that the ethnic configuration in Africa is now irreversible, and that it would be unwise for many countries to break up since this could not be done without war. Instead they advocate that the problem of ethnic injustice in Africa can best be solved by popular participation in government, by power sharing, and by the promotion of liberal democracy and such devices as rotating presidences, and a weak form of federalism. (Adekanye, 1998; Ake, 1996a, 1996b,; Oladipo, 2000; Bello, 2002; Oguejiofor, 2000).

Dictatorships

Bello (2002: 240) however singles out the selfish and autocratic tendency of the African leaders as a major obstacle to liberal democracy and development in Africa. The alienation that is an inherent feature of new African societies results from lack of respect for human and people's rights, which are basic ingredients of liberal democracy. There is therefore nothing wrong with the concept of multi-party democracy in Africa rather it is the practice that is flawed.

> This malaise is due to dictatorial, despotic and autocratic political leaders who are afraid of being voted out of power if they allowed free, fair and transparent elections; this has happened, in recent times, for example; in the Kenya, Zimbabwe, Gambia, Liberia, Gabon, and Ivory Coast (Bello,2002: 241).

The plague of underdevelopment ravaging Africa from our brief exposé straddles several other factors such as economic, political instability, ethnicity, leadership, African conception of the state due to colonial experiences, failure of developmental programs and cronyism among others. It is also worth noting that many regional and continental bodies such as ECOWAS and defunct OAU, which were to serve the political and economic interest of Africans, have recorded little or negligible success. Their failure is not due to the inviolability of the sovereignty of the member states; rather than to the fact that these

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bodies have been weak and economical with truth when it comes to calling member nations to order. For instance, they have implicitly endorsed autocratic and dictatorial leadership in most African states to a degree that is highly antithetical to development.

Recently, between 2002 and 2003, two other continental bodies, the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) came into existence to address the twin problems of economic development and political instability. NEPAD for instance, was seen as:

> An African package offered to the international community in return for increased aid, investment, debt relief and trade opportunities. It would also involve African states committing themselves to democracy, good governance and peace. It can be seen as a Marshall plan for Africa. (*Post Express*, Sept 1 2002: 26)

Most of the African leaders have expressed their determination to make NEPAD work, according to Meles Zenairi of Ethopia, "in the present global environment, we all survive or sink together." Also Thabo Mbeki of South Africa says "we are making our own commitments about democracy, about peace, about corruption and about our home grown efforts to put our resources into development" (*Ibid.*). Lofty promises and ideals, indeed! But it is our contention in this paper that the problem of development of the African continent can only be addressed if we re-examine the values that underline African societies. In this regard, the remaining part of this paper will be devoted to how we can align community or communal values with the question of African identity in order to engender and sustain development in Africa

Communal Values and the Quest for Social Order in Africa.

Communal values, following Gyekye, are those values that "express appreciation of the worth and importance of the community" (Gyekye, 1996:35). It is these values that define and guide the social relationship in the form of attitude and behavior that should exist between individuals living together in a community, "sharing a social life and having a sense of common good" (*Ibid.*). These values include mutual aid, caring for others, selflessness, interdependence, solidarity, reciprocal obliga-

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tions, social harmony and mutual trust. There is no doubt that communal values do help in facilitating peaceful co-existence and harmony, which are a pre-requisite for social order and development in any society. Social order can be taken to mean: first, arrangement or state of things in the society; second, proper functioning of societal institutions; third, political stability. In a broad sense, the concept 'social order' is used to refer to the harmonious functioning of different facets of a society such as the political, economic, religious, and scientific and technological institutions. It is through the harmonious functioning of these different institutions that there can be development in any human society. Hence, there is always the need to regulate the conduct of individual members of society to ensure social order.

The proper application and appreciation of communal values within the contemporary African society can go a long way in helping to address the problem of development being experienced in Africa. Even economic progress, growth in industries, and scientific and technological advancements, do not translate into development unless they are coated with enduring human values. Let us, for the sake of clarity, consider the modest ways in which these values can be applied.

The contemporary African is faced with a myriad of problems especially those which result from contact with Western culture, which has shattered the traditional pattern of kinship-based social organization. In other words, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the contemporary African to subordinate his interests to that of the community. However, it is through the stability of the community that individuals can maximize their freedom.

The major problem in contemporary Africa is cultural and moral dislocation, which has been accentuated by the disruption of traditional society, rapid population growth and overly rapid urbanization. To take Nigeria as an example, which does not have the severest problem in this respect, the total population of Nigeria as cited in Webster's Geographical Dictionary was just over 19 million in 1966; but with a very high fecundity rat and declining death rate, the number of Nigerians had exploded to 134 million by mid 2003. Furthermore, as projected by the Population Reference Bureau in New York (2004) is it estimated to exceed 206 million by the year 2025! Such rapid demographic changes

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exert great pressures on traditional social and economic organization, and one result has been an unprecedented manifestation of greed, selfishness, acquisitiveness, sexual immorality, distrust, and lack of respect for tradition. As the traditional fabric of society is disrupted, individuals no longer see themselves as a part of, and subject to the control of, their community. The individual has increasingly become an isolated entity because the subtle social controls which the traditional society exercised over him is no longer possible in contemporary society. One way of attempting to curb this ill is to ensure that individuals have participatory roles in communal affairs (Echekwube, 1994:101).

Consumerism

Africa's economic problems cannot be solved unless Africans redevelop a sense of community and adopt a humanistic attitude towards economic issues. While advances in science and technology following the industrial revolution in Europe have revolutionized human productive capacities, African society is still confronting the problem of economic development. This goes beyond under-production and the inability to attain and adopt modern technology. Contrary to the communal economic system in traditional African societies, which allowed for the protection of the individual by the community and the preservation of the community through the efforts of the individual, what we have now in many African societies is an economic orientation in which little consideration is given to common welfare. The issue is not whether African countries adopt a particular economic ideology, rather the problem has to do with the greed and selfishness exhibited by African leaders which has made economic development a daunting task.

The economy of the traditional tribal society was largely self-sustaining because the community was essentially a kinship group engaged in co-operative endeavors. Though the profit motive was primary, moral considerations were also a consideration in business transactions. By contrast, contemporary economic relationships are determined solely by profit not by the welfare of the parties involved. Morality plays no role in such relationships. It cannot be difficult to see the reason why people use foul means which are inimical to the well-being of other members of the nation in order to achieve their goals.

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Individuals who display ill-gotten affluence are not questioned with regard to the sources of their wealth. Contemporary economic relation are characterized by unbridled desire for personal wealth and material benefits. This trend, in the words of Ehusani, "emphasizes the accumulation of goods and the multiplication of techniques to the neglect of the development of the person" (Ehusani, 1991:242).

Contemporary African society has become guilty of a false consciousness of consumerism. A society many of whose individual members produce wealth that they do not consume, and in which others consume wealth that they do not produce, lacks political stability (Bolarinwa, 1993:95-96). This is further acerbated by neglect of the environment, as governments do nothing to counter the destruction of forests and degradation of the agricultural potential of the land, as the neglected and impoverished but ever-expanding rural population seeks to find sustenance by traditional methods of cultivation which cannot support their rapidly growing numbers.

Religious Conflict

Moral dislocation and its attendant vices and economic underdevelopment are issues that cannot be treated in isolation from the religious beliefs of the people. The religious conflicts in contemporary African societies today have created conflicts which threaten social order. The reason for this is understandable: the foreign religions introduced into African societies have not been able to work together towards the same goals of salvation for both the community and the individual. If there is any lesson to be learned from the traditional African universe, it is that there was formerly religious tolerance by adherents of the various divinities and deities.

Rivalry between the two main foreign religions, Christianity and Islam, has degenerated into open conflict in countries such as Sudan and Nigeria (c.f. the Maitasine riots, the Kano riots, the Sagamu riots, and even the Kaduna riots). These claim human lives and a loss of incalculable material resources which would have been available for development. Even the Algerian disturbances of 1990, leading to the annulment of an election victory by Islamic fundamentalists, reflected a conflict between Islam and secular interests.

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While they seek to promote the welfare of their own adherents, neither of these religions have really given enough priority to the welfare of other members of society. The ideal of religion is only meaningful within a social context because it presupposes among other things a set of people who adopts a certain attitude towards God. Personal salvation, therefore, is only meaningful within the context of societal salvation, and where the two foreign religions oppose each other, African society is being damaged by the resultant conflicts that put religious ideology above the welfare of society as a whole.

The Problem of Democratization

One major problem, which many regard as central, in contemporary Africa is that of self-governance. This problem is popularly described as the problem of "democratization". It is believed that the lack of democratization of the African continent has been responsible for its backwardness in all facets of life. The question then is: How can the insights gained from traditional African values help in addressing the knotty issue of democratization?

The entrenchment of democratic values requires the adoption of some moral values as well as the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. In traditional African society elevation or appointment to the chieftain's stool and related posts was based on communal consent and not imposition of unpopular candidates. In addition, individuality, personal responsibility, equality of moral worth of a person and such other virtues were respected. The individual was protected by the strong kinship structure around which society was organized. The fact can not be over-emphasized that no society can develop unless individuals comply with certain moral virtues especially those that stress communal living an de-emphasize any individualist tendencies that are inimical to the development of the society. Adherence to these moral virtues is a *sine-qua-non* for the enthronement of a democratic order, the absence of which has made the acquisitive tendency the guiding principle of those saddled with the affairs of state in most African countries. It is not surprising then that many scholars are re-emphasizing the fact that morality and politics must go together. In other words, leaders and followers must be guided by certain moral

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principles without which the resources of the state cannot be properly managed. But when the traditional social order has been disrupted by rapid changes in the economic basis of society, and individuals have been torn from their kinsmen by forced migration to cities in search of subsistence, the moral order of society is likewise disrupted, and it is easier for self-seeking individuals to gain power and to use that power for their own gain rather than for the welfare of the people.

The second element is adequate participation by the people in decision-making, which could help to minimize conflict. In many traditional African societies, decisions were made by local consensus (Sofola, 1973: Wiredu; 1995). The use of consensus ensured that dissenting groups were persuaded to see the merit of the opposing position, or at least to make a minority element more ready to accede to the dominant view. Decision-making by consensus did not imply that there was unanimity in all decision; but it helped to prevent the creation of opposing camps which is a prominent feature of contemporary majoritarian democracy, especially in Africa, where the post-colonial political states do not follow ethnic boundaries, and one ethnic group is often dominated by another larger group, from which it had previously enjoyed autonomy.

The danger of majoritarian democracy, according to Wiredu, (1995: 61) is one of the major causes of political instability in Africa. This is because some ethnic groups and individuals who find themselves in the minority are perpetually marginalized. The tendency for a dominant group to regard those in the minority as unimportant means that they will consistently find themselves outside the corridors of power and the ultimate result is disaffection and frustration.

Another advantage of the consensus arrangement was that since dissenting voices were made to see the reasons behind the majority opinion, when the majority opinion had a better chance of becoming the general opinion accepted and binding on all. Sofola (1973:30) describes this system as "government by discussion and consent." Contemporary African states should endeavor to ensure that consensus is sought in cases where there are no fundamental disagreements.

It is when the government is run through popular participation that it can discharge its duty in contemporary society as the regulator of

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power and work for the good of the people over whom it has power (Oladipo, 1998:2). However, most of the leaders in African states have failed to behave like true statesmen because they have not developed a sense of responsibility. Hence, it is even difficult for them to exercise any legitimacy over the people and this makes social conflict inevitable (*ibid*: 7).

Africans must shun authoritarian tendencies and find their power in the loyalty and support of the people. They can only do this by allowing people to participate freely in issues that affect their lives. The attempt to inject traditional values into the present socio-political arrangement in Africa also needs an educational orientation that places emphasis on the total development of the individual. The goal of development should enable us to eradicate poverty, disease and underdevelopment of all kinds. In this regard, we must embrace communal values and shun some individualist tendencies that are inimical to development.

African Cultural Identity and Development

The question that needs to be addressed is this: since it is necessary for Africans to identify with the world community in their quest for development, and isolation is no longer practicable, does the African thereby lose his cultural identity? In the contemporary world we have an African who has been alienated from his indigenous African culture and who has not really grasped the alien culture which he tries to imitate. Apart from imbibing foreign values, the challenges of modernity, which are characterized by an innovative spirit, also makes it impossible for a culture to remain isolated from developments in other cultures. Hence, the pursuit of a rigid African identity becomes impossible and undesirable.

Given that it is no longer possible to maintain cultural isolation for the reasons given above, any attempts to postulate a 'unique African personality' involving African ways of knowing, thinking and acting, such as we find in Senghor and Blyden, would be spurious. Senghor, for instance, had argued that the African mode of knowing is a holistic one in which the idea of a dualism between man and nature, subject and object, mind and matter, are totally absent (Oladipo, 1995: 28). Senghor attempts to juxtapose a 'so-called' African mode of knowing with the

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European analytic method. His desire to defend the 'African world-view' in the face of European denigration of African culture causes him to construct a contradictory and exaggerated African world-view. However, instead of trying to defend African identity at all cost, we should preoccupy ourselves with the benefits that can accrue to us from indigenous and foreign cultures in order to improve the current situation. There is an urgent need for every culture to engage in mutual borrowing in order to develop. Every culture must embrace useful artifacts and values where these are appropriate.

The readiness to borrow from other cultures should not be misconstrued to mean that anything goes in Africa and that Africans do not have their cultural peculiarities. To the contrary, there are valuable cultural traits that are peculiar to Africans, and these will surely survive. However, Africans also share certain universals of culture with others. It is because, these universals of cultures exist that human communication is possible. Furthermore, the deeper the understanding among different cultures through these universals of culture, the easier it becomes for cultures to share experiences about production, science and technology (*ibid*: 30).

According to Wiredu (*ibid*, :31-32) culture can be put into two broad categories. The first category contains those aspects which have no essential bearing on questions of either human well-being or truth or falsehood. Examples include procedures, customs and usages such as language, style of dress, dance, music and style of courtship. All these items are merely contingent: therefore there cannot be any compelling reason to consciously strive to change them in favor of foreign ones. The main reason for this, Wiredu argues, is that they have no essential bearing on human well-being, although some will doubtless be affected by changes in technology and the means of subsistence.

The second category of culture is made up of elements of culture that are anchored to "truth values." In other words, they have essential bearing on human well-being. They include philosophy, science, and even religion. It follows that any of these elements can be replaced by a foreign one, if its replacement will contribute to the well-being of the people.

Wiredu's two broad categorizations of culture show that Africa can

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borrow the scientific and technological culture of Europe to replace her primitive science without losing her identity. Although there may be certain cultural peculiarities for every group of people in the world, these peculiarities are not enough for any culture to close the doors of development.

While abandoning aspects of African culture that are inimical to development, the communal tradition of African society can still serve as the basis of African social identity. Sofola puts it thus:

> The essentially humane and moralistic ideas, beliefs and customs among the Africans are the non-material aspects of their African culture which the individual African in his socialization or upbringing has imbibed and internalized to form his personality (Sofola,op.cit.:67)

Let us conclude by noting that this emphasis on the traditional communal nature of the African, associated as it is with solidarity and fellow-feeling, helps us to preserve the lives of individuals. In other words, the virtue of African communal life was that it provided support for the individual in times of sorrow, want and frustration. The breakdown of traditional tribal life and kinship ties amongst the urbanized masses has cut the individual off from his community, and by weakening the individual has facilitated corruption amongst those in power. Development cannot be brought about peripherally and in cosmetic form; it must be rooted in people's beliefs and attitudes towards such beliefs. Development must be founded on community values as also the need to embrace universal human values. This is the challenge that must be accepted by a new generation of African leaders if the African continent, rich in natural resources, is to move forward.

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Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges

The Olympians were not the only source of religion in ancient Greece and Rome. More important was the worship of the lineage, symbolized by the sacred hearth fire and the reverence in which the ancestors were held.

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The Jews and Capitalism: A Love-Hate Enigma

Walter Block[1]
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This paper attempts to understand why the Jews, who have benefited so much from capitalism, nevertheless in the main adopt political postures that reject capitalism in favor of its polar opposite, socialism and government intervention into the economy. The author discusses various theories that have been proposed to explain why this group of people, whose socio-economic status might be expected to incline them in the direction of the Republican political party in the U.S., instead vote in overwhelming numbers for Democrat party candidates.

Key Words: Jews; Christians; capitalism; socialism; intellectuals; immigration; political bias.

I Introduction

There is no doubt that at least in some sense, there is a love-hate relationship between Jews and Capitalism.

On the one hand, there is a strong tradition of support for socialism, communism, labor unionism, feminism, and affirmative action within the Jewish community. Names such as Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky, Sigmund Freud, Rosa Luxemburg, Bernard Sanders, Laurence Tribe, Paul Wellstone, Alan Dershowitz, and Russell Feingold spring to mind – but only as the veritable tip of an iceberg which flows deep.

As well, according to the political aphorism, "Jews have the income of Presbyterians, and yet vote like Puerto Ricans." Jews have a strong tradition of casting ballots for the Democratic Party[2] and have long taken a supportive interest in groups such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which is also solidly in the corner of this political party.[3]

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[2] Lilla, 2001; Lefkowitz, 1993; Fuchs, 1956:
http://www.burntorangereport.com/archives/000938.html
See also appendix 1.

[3] It must be emphasized that the phenomenon under discussion in the present paper mainly

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On the other hand, there can be little doubt that capitalism has been very good to Jews. Many members of this faith have prospered as businessmen. This would tend to incline most people in such a situation in the direction of support for the marketplace.

Nor can it be denied that several of their numbers have taken on high profile roles in defense of this system. Examples include Gary Becker, Walter Block, Nathaniel Brandon, Aaron Director, Richard Epstein, Milton Friedman, David Friedman, Rose Friedman, David Gordon, Friedrich Hayek, Steve Horwitz, Israel Kirzner, Benjamin Klein, Dan Klein, Peter Klein, Michael Levin, Ludwig von Mises, Larry Moss, Robert Nozick, Larry Parks, Leonard Piekoff, Richard Posner, Ayn Rand, George Reisman, Murray N. Rothbard, Bernard Seigan, Dan Seligman, and Julian Simon[4].

Nevertheless, despite such exceptions, the overwhelming preponderance of opinion within this community lies in the direction of government interventionism and dirigisme economics[5]. What accounts for this rather exceptionable behavior? Various theories have been put forth in an attempt to explain this phenomenon. The present paper is devoted to discussing and evaluating several of them.[6]

Before embarking on this task, however, we do well to remark on the fact that ordinarily in most analyses of group or individual behavior the analyst does not go too far wrong in relying upon the doctrine of *quo bono*? That is, most human action can be explained in terms of self-interest. But the Jews, it would appear, offer evidence of being a counter-example to this general rule.

Support for affirmative action and gun control on the part of the

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focuses on North America in general and the U.S. in particular. The Jewish European experience is not examined in this paper.

[4] Some might be tempted to include in this listing the high percentage of Jewish names amongst the recently much discussed "neo-conservatives."

[5] Among the proxy variables used to defend this contention are the identification of Republican voting with free enterprise, and Democratic with socialism. These are of course only rough approximations. Yet, surely, using proxies in this way is more accurate than the other way around; e.g., identifying Republicanism with socialism and Democratism with *laissez faire* capitalism.

[6] For previous attempts in this regard, see Block 1985, 1990, 1996.

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Jewish community are particularly difficult to understand in this regard. When a plan of coerced racial preferences in education is implemented, it benefits groups such as blacks and Hispanics. But who are the people who lose out when such people are chosen? It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Jews are over-represented in this category[7]. As for guns, who has not heard of the Warsaw uprising, and of the repression these people experienced under Nazi rule? Surely, if the Jews of Germany, Poland and other eastern European countries had been heavily armed in the late 1930s, their fate would have likely been less horrific.[8] And this is to say nothing of attacks suffered by Hasidim in neighborhoods such as Crown Heights in Brooklyn, New York. Surely pistols would be of help in quelling such disturbances. Despite the foregoing, Jews as a group have been adamant in championing policies that, it would appear, are directly incompatible with their own self-interest.

2 Intellectuals

2.1 Overrepresentation amongst Intellectuals

Jews are over-represented among intellectuals (Seligman, 1994)[9], and intellectuals tend to take on left-wing views on economics.[10] This undoubtedly gives at least some impetus to support for socialism from this segment of the population.

There are several plausible ways in which to define "intellectuals." One is to include those who earn a living through the use of abstract reasoning, or as wordsmiths, or as "second-hand dealers in ideas"

[7] Seligman, 1994.

[8] Lott, 1998.

[9] Seligman (1994) attributes this phenomenon to the higher IQ scores of Jews. Hayek (1990, p. 19, ft. 3) demurs: "... there is little reason to believe that really first class intellectual ability for original work is any rarer among Gentiles than among Jews." However, Hayek (1990, p. 19, ft. 3) continues: "... there can be little doubt that men of Jewish stock almost everywhere constitute a disproportionately large number of the intellectuals in our sense, that is of the ranks of the professional interpreters of ideas. This may be their special gift and certainly is their main opportunity in countries where prejudice puts obstacles in their way in other fields. It is probably more because they constitute so large a proportion of the intellectuals than for any other reason that they seem to be so much more receptive to socialist ideas than people of different stocks."

[10] States Hayek (1988 p. 53): "The higher we climb up the ladder of intelligence, the more we talk with intellectuals, the more likely we are to encounter socialist convictions. Rationalists tend to be intelligent and intellectual; and intelligent intellectuals tend to be socialists."

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(Hayek, 1990, p. 5). Examples of this category would be professors, journalists, clergy and writers – those who directly or indirectly mold public opinion. A more inclusive definition would add professions in which a high degree of intelligence is required, but where such people are not typically the source of ideas for others. Mises (1972, p. 16) includes "physicians" under this rubric. Others in this category might be physicists, engineers, pharmacists, accountants, architects, etc. An even wider definition would add to this list all of those who think deeply about current events, read widely, keep themselves informed, etc. An operational definition of this third rung of intellectuals would be those who purchase books, keep them at home, frequent libraries, watch news shows on television, etc.

Hayek (1990) takes great pains to distinguish intellectuals, in any of these three senses, from experts. The latter are in effect the originators of ideas; the former, the megaphone, or transmission device, with which these ideas are transferred to the general public. His illustration of the economics profession is a telling one. Asks Hayek (1990, p. 8): "Yet is it not the predominant views of the experts but the views of a minority, mostly of rather doubtful standing in their profession, which are taken up and spread by the intellectuals?" Although he does not mention him, reading between the lines one can almost see the name "Galbraith." It is the ideas of this worthy that are transmitted to the average man on the street, even though his views are those of only a small minority within the economics profession, most of whom strongly disagrees with his perspective on socialism, protectionism, and the evils of the capitalist system.[11]

Whether we choose the narrow, the medium or the wider definition of intellectual, it cannot be denied that in America Jewish people are disproportionately represented in these numbers. As for the first category, they are the "talking heads" on television, the professors, the editorialists – in numbers far in excess of their proportion of the

[11] A more modern example of this is former President Clinton, playing the role of "intellectual," publicly relying upon the "experts" Card and Krueger (1994) to raise the minimum wage level in order to help unskilled workers, despite the fact that this is very much a minority position among economists.

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population. As for the second, they dominate the professions of medicine, dentistry, psychology, science, etc. And even in the third, when they have jobs as the proverbial "butchers, bakers and candlestick makers," they are still well read and involved in current events to a greater degree than those of their counterparts who follow other religious beliefs.

2.2 Early Educational Experiences

Why is it that such a high proportion of contemporary American intellectuals, defined as those who engage in the manipulation of political and economic ideas, oppose free enterprise? Nozick (1997) maintains this is due to the fact that these people, when they were in high school, had the highest grades and the greatest official recognition, but the job market relegates them to a far lower position in the pecking order than at that time. The result: resentment of the system responsible for not giving them their due.

Van den Haag (2000/2001, pp 56-57) rejects this thesis on the grounds that, one, the business world does reward people on a basis proportional to intelligence and, two, "Nozick is quite wrong in believing that superior intelligence is readily rewarded in high schools." Instead, he contends, bouquets are tossed on the basis of athletic prowess.

In my view, Van den Haag's criticisms fall short of the mark. While it cannot be denied that most high school *students* extol athletics over academics, this is not at all the case for teachers. Further, it is equally true that the brainiacs, nerds and geeks also get their due (if not, perhaps, in inner city high schools, which must be counted as an exception to this rule). There are scholarships, trips to the student versions of the U.N., chess and mathematics tournaments, the debating club, etc. With the advent of Bill Gates, who earns far more than Michael Jordan, the smart kids are coming into their own even more. Van den Haag is of course correct that amongst teenagers, athletes and "tough kids" command more respect in some sense; but this is irrelevant to the point Nozick is making, that the highly intelligent high school student is given a strong ego boost by the adult world. Even when the nerd is being physically bullied, he still has a strong sense of entitlement based on his grade scores and other such recognition.

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It of course cannot be denied that there is indeed a positive correlation between intelligence and business success (Murray, 1998), but there are enough exceptions to rile intellectuals. Consider only those in this regard earning a relatively modest salary as associate professors of literature, while the ex-high school class bozo makes it big selling toys or burgers and drives around town in a car far more luxurious than theirs. There can be little doubt that Nozick is telling an important part of the story of the disaffection of the intellectuals when he bases it on their high school experiences.

2.3 Purposes vs. Effects

Then, too, intellectuals, particularly those not involved in economics (Frey, et. al., 1984, Block and Walker, 1988), often confuse accomplishments with motives.[12] The *goal* of the businessman may well be to maximize profits, something unsavory in the view of the great (economic) unwashed. But this should be seen as distinct from the *effects* of his actions, which are altogether very salutary, particularly to the poor in advanced capitalist nations. This tendency is exacerbated by Jewish, and indeed most religious people, who focus mainly on intent, not results. There is ignorance of Adam Smith's (1776) great finding of the "invisible hand," which leads people to do good for others even though it was no part of their intention to do so.

Further, intellectuals labor under the implicit premise that the morality of the deed ought to be matched by economic reward. That is, the callings of nurses, theologians, doctors, firemen, moralists, clergymen – and of course academics – are all thought to be imbued with a particular moral grace. And yet with the exception of physicians, they are not particularly highly paid. But this too plays into Jewish and indeed all religious precepts, where morality is given a particularly central role.

2.4 Too Accurate a Mirror

Mises (1972, pp. 11-16) puts forth a theory to the effect that intellectuals resent capitalism because it is merciless in revealing their failure

[12] The typical sociologist or religion professor guilty of this confusion may have a Ph.D. in these fields, but is no genius when it comes to economic reasoning.

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to make a greater contribution to society. In days of yore, when a man's accomplishments were severely reined in by his place in society, those who failed to garner great wealth or position had a readily available excuse: they were born into the wrong caste, or class, or social position; it was thus not their fault that they rose no higher than they did. None of their fellows, with the same birth disadvantages, likely did any better. States Mises (1972, p. 11, 13): "In a society based on caste and status, the individual can ascribe adverse fate to conditions beyond his own control... Everybody is aware of his own defeat and insufficiency."

Under markets, however, in sharp contrast, none of these excuses held true any longer. "It is quite another thing under capitalism. Here everybody's station in life depends upon his own doing," in the view of Mises (1972, p. 11). A Bill Gates could move from a position of no special prominence to become the richest man in the world. What must his childhood chums think of this meteoric rise?

The stupid ones, Mises (1972, p. 15) tells us, "release these feelings in slander and defamation. The more sophisticated do not indulge in personal calumny. They sublimate their hatred into a philosophy, the philosophy of anti-capitalism, in order to render inaudible the inner voice that tells them that their failure is entirely their own fault." But "the more sophisticated" are precisely the intellectuals we have been discussing. Not for them, merely, a personal attack on the Bill Gateses of the world[13]. In addition, the weaving of a philosophical system which has at its core the evils of the marketplace, where some, e.g., Gates, rise to heights that are clearly "unfair," insofar as they very much put these "intellectuals" into the shade. In summarizing this point, Mises (1972, p. 18) states: "His passionate dislike of capitalism is a mere blind for his hatred of some successful 'colleagues.'"

2.5 Broadway and Hollywood

It is something of a stretch to consider the denizens of Broadway and Hollywood as "intellectuals," even with the broad definition of that

[13] Although it is indeed tempting to interpret the anti-trust case of the late 1990s as spiteful acting out against the more successful. For an analysis that in part makes use of this motive, see Anderson, et. al. 2001.

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term we are employing[14]. Truth, accuracy and facts are not their stock in trade, as they are, at least ideally, for the intellectual; rather, imagination, communication skills, emotion and beauty serve as the coin of the realm in these places. Yet, it cannot be denied that quite a high level of intelligence is required to produce movies, plays and literature successfully. In any case, these activities are dominated by members of the Jewish community, and thus come under our consideration for both these reasons.

Mises (1972, pp.31-32) explains the Communist leanings of these communities on the basis of the intrinsic risk of the entertainment industry:

> "People long for amusement because they are bored. And nothing makes them so weary as amusements with which they are already familiar. The essence of the entertainment industry is variety. The patrons applaud most what is new and therefore unexpected and surprising. They are capricious and unaccountable. They disdain what they cherished yesterday. A tycoon of the stage or the screen must always fear the waywardness of the public...It is obvious that there is no relief from what makes these stage people uneasy. Thus they catch at a straw. Communism, some of them think, will bring their deliverance."

This has all the earmarks of a good explanation. There is no truer statement than that "no other American milieu was more enthusiastic in the endorsement of communism than that of people cooperating in the production of these silly plays and films" (Mises, 1972, p. 33). This was no less true at the time Mises wrote than at present. Hollywood and Broadway in many ways represent a crap-shoot, with great losses and great profits for different projects, based on an always-fickle public. Say what you will about Communism, at least it cannot be denied that those who remain in the good graces of the rulers never need fear bankruptcy.

And yet, if it were really true that people in industries facing high risk would be inclined toward economic adventurism because of that fact, then this ought to apply to others as well. For example, wild-cat oil drilling is a notoriously risky business; there are many dry holes found

[14] See footnote 8, above.

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for every wet one. There have been many business failures among the dot.com start-up companies. However, the predilection toward socialism correctly pointed to by Mises in the entertainment industry by no means carries through to oil exploration or new computer firms. Thus, the risk of a business appears to be a poor predictor of left-wing ideological support.

2.6 Contempt for Intellectuals

Another factor that at least in part explains the fevered criticisms of capitalism by so many contemporary intellectuals is the contempt with which they are held by the leaders of this system, the businessmen. The derisive "pointy-headed intellectuals with a briefcase" hurled by former Alabama Governor George Wallace at the bureaucrats of Washington D.C. during his presidential election campaign, is only the tip of the iceberg in this regard. The leaders of large firms hold the intellectuals in little esteem, and this perspective has percolated into the society at large. In literature, in films, on the stage, the intellectual is often depicted as absent-minded, ineffectual and physically weak.

In Hayek's (1990, p. 10) view: "It is not surprising that the real scholar or expert and the practical man of affairs often feel contemptuous about the intellectual, are disinclined to recognize his power, and are resentful when they discover it. Individually they find the intellectuals mostly to be people who understand nothing in particular especially well and whose judgment on matters they themselves understand shows little sign of special wisdom."

It is only human nature, under these conditions, for intellectuals to play "pay back" with business leaders. If the latter hold the former in contempt, then this sentiment can be returned, with interest, in the form of rejection of capitalism. It is no accident that in the academic and Hollywood worlds, captains of industry should be portrayed as greedy, grasping, avaricious, and immoral.[15] What with strong "political correctness" sentiment opposed to characterizing in a poor light "protected" groups such as blacks, Jews, women, the handicapped, and other such, it is rare that the villain in most movies and television shows

[15] As a case in point, see the movie "Wall Street."

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is other than a white male, pre-eminently a white male businessman[16].

States Mises (1972, pp.19, 20, material in parentheses supplied by present author) in this regard: "What is called 'society' in the United States almost exclusively consists of the richest families. There is little social intercourse between the successful businessmen and the nation's eminent authors, artists and scientists... (the former consider the latter) as people with whom they do not want to consort" and then refers to the "resentment with which the intellectuals react to the contempt in which they are held by the members of 'society.'"

3 Alternative Explanations

The reason we focus so heavily on the effects of intellectualism in determining Jewish criticisms of free enterprise is that there is a serious question as to whether this is a sufficient explanation of the phenomenon. That is, does the intellectualism of the Jewish people swamp their religion, insofar as implications for political philosophy are concerned? To put this in other words, once we have noted that a person is an intellectual and a Jew, does the impetus of the former toward left-wing views exhaust that of the latter? Or, does being a member of the Jewish community add any more explanatory power to socialist beliefs already there? In fact, is the socialist domination of contemporary intellectualism in some part due to the dominance of socialist-leaning Jews within the contemporary Western intellectual world (e.g. the influence of Franz Boas in the development of American anthropology away from its very un-Socialistic origins)?

It is to these questions that we now turn. We will attempt to discern, when we add "Jewishness" to a person who already is an intellectual, does this *further* incline him in the direction of socialism?[17] If so, then Judaism supplies an added impetus to dirigisme leanings that is not already in place on the part of intellectuals. If not, then these religious

[16] In the "Manchurian Candidate" movie of 1962, the bad guys were Commies. In the 2004 version, they were in the main big businessmen (the one exception is the female senator, a white woman). Extrapolating from this one change, we can say that the phenomenon now under discussion is increasing in power and virulence.

[17] I am indebted to my friend and colleague, Bill Barnett, for impressing upon me the importance of this question.

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beliefs do not make an independent contribution to market opposition that is not already present in the thinking of the typical leftist intellectual.[18]

3.1 Religious Considerations

One hypothesis that could be used to account for Jewish bias against *laissez faire* capitalism is that it is based upon religious considerations. The theory is that the Old Testament, the Bible, the Talmud and other formal written aspects of the religion impart a receptivity toward the left side of the political economic spectrum to its adherents.[19] For example, the admonition to be charitable, *tzedakah*, might be used to justify the welfare system. Or the commandment not to "covet" the possessions of others might be considered a warning against "greed," which, in turn,

[18] There are some who would be inclined to argue that "leftist intellectual" is a veritable contradiction in terms. This is a very tempting interpretation. Given that the market is the most moral and economically efficient system known to man, it is hard to credit the good sense, let alone intelligence of anyone who opposes it. As intellectuals are quintessentially those noted for precisely these characteristics, we arrive at the point where we are tempted to disqualify all candidates from the honorific title "intellectual" who persist in their rejection of *laissez faire* capitalism. But we do not use the term in this manner for the present article. One reason is the fact that a person could reject free enterprise not out of stupidity, but rather evil; this might well leave his claim to intelligence intact. Another is that were we to automatically disqualify all Marxists and their ilk from the rank of intellectuals, we would need another word to describe those who favor socialism and yet write books, give speeches, serve as faculty members of universities, or in any other such way earn a living through the promotion of these ideas. Thus, the term "intellectual" is not a term that necessarily implies accuracy of analysis. Rather, if refers to those who, from *any* perspective, deal with social and economic ideas in their professions. Sowell (1980, pp. 331-332) defines intellectuals "as the social class of persons whose economic output consists of generalized ideas, and whose economic rewards come from the transmission of those generalized ideas. This in no way implies any qualitative cognitive judgment concerning the originality, creativity, intelligence or authenticity of the ideas transmitted. Intellectuals are simply defined in a sociological sense, and a transmitter of shallow, confused or wholly unsubstantiated ideas is as much of an intellectual in this sense as Einstein." This is precisely my own view. I would only add that the use of Einstein in this example applies solely to his contributions to physics. When it came to economics (Einstein, 1949), his views were the usual confused mish mash of the leftist Jewish intellectual.

[19] For the view that the claims of liberation theologians to the effect that the Old Testament of the Jews was *not* receptive to markets and private property is mistaken, and that this mistaken analysis is due to a reading of these texts divorced from the economic and sociological conditions under which they were written, see Liggio, 1997.

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might be seen as the organizing principle of the market. Or the injunction to observe *ona'ah* might be interpreted as opposition to earning profits above a certain level.[20]

However, the claim that the Talmud is responsible (directly for the religious, and indirectly for the less so) for elevating socialism and denigrating capitalism in this community is countered by the fact that one of the Ten Commandments proscribes theft. If stealing is illegal, it can only be because there is such a thing as a valid system of private property rights; if there were not, it would be logically impossible to engage in any such activity as theft. But private property rights are the bedrock of the capitalist system; if Jewish law promotes this concept, and it most certainly does, then its criticism of markets cannot be a fundamental aspect of the religion.

3.2 Historical Political Considerations

Friedman (1985, p. 403) couches the problem we are addressing in terms of a paradox: "Two propositions can be readily demonstrated: first, the Jews owe an enormous debt to free enterprise and competitive capitalism; second, for at least the past century the Jews have been consistently opposed to capitalism and have done much on an ideological level to undermine it."

He offers two explanations for this paradox. The first one stems from historical conditions prevailing in Europe, and especially France at the time of the French revolution: only the left, not the right, was willing to tolerate Jewish participation in public life. And second, the Jewish reaction to the stereotype of them by the population at large, that they were grasping, greedy and concerned with commerce and money-lending. States Friedman (1985, p. 412) about the Jewish reaction to this charge:

> "... to deny that Jews are like the stereotype, to set out to persuade oneself, and incidentally the anti-Semites, that far from being money-grabbing, selfish and heartless, Jews are really public-spirited, generous, and concerned with ideals rather than material goods. How better to do so than to attack the market with its reliance on monetary values and

[20] For an analysis of this concept, see Block, 2002a

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> impersonal transactions and to glorify the political process, to take as an ideal a state run by well-meaning people for the benefit of their fellow man."[21]

I have no doubt that both of Friedman's explanations contain more than just a small amount of truth. However, the historical one must be taken with a grain of salt, since the historical antecedents relied upon by Friedman should not be over generalized[22]. For all that, it is not easy to dismiss this as *part* of the explanation, precisely Friedman's point.

Second, Friedman posits that the Jews *could* have accepted the stereotype imposed upon them by society as a whole, and attempted to demonstrate that a concern for money, commerce, profits, etc., contrary to the prevailing view, was actually *beneficial* to society. He (1985, p. 413) replies:

> "But this reaction was hardly to be expected. None of us can escape the intellectual air we breathe, can fail to be influenced by the values of the community in which we live. As Jews left their closed ghettos and shtetls and came into contact with the rest of the world, they inevitably came to accept and share the values of that world...."

But this response, while a reasonable generalization, is not definitive. Friedman himself is a counterexample. He has for the most part not been "influenced" by the socialist values of the community in which *he* lives[23]. If he could do it, why not others, many others, particularly Jews, who have more than average intelligence, and thus at least the potential to see through the popular socialist nostrums? Second, this answer is incomplete, for it leaves open the question of why the Jews, when they

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[21] For a critique of Friedman's thesis, see Frankel (1985, pp. 429-442). Frankel (1985, p. 436) rejects Friedman's mention of the makeup of the French parliament as "a-historical," and objects to his reliance on fighting stereotypes as based upon Sombart's (1913) analysis. Friedman (1985, pp. 443- 446) replies that he does not at all rely upon Sombart, and that Frankel provides no evidence to back up his "a-historical" charge. In this debate, I concur entirely with Friedman.

[22] We are concerned in this paper mainly with Jewish experience in America. Why are we then discussing France? Because, it can be argued, this French experience nevertheless seared the American Jewish soul.

[23] For an exception to this statement, see Block (1999).

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emerged from their ghettos,[24] found rampant socialism? Why were they not met with prevailing capitalist ideas?

3.3 Minority Status, Persecution

Sowell (1994, p. 231) notes the "remarkable historic achievements of the Jews – a relatively small group of people, spread thinly around the world, and yet so prominent in so many countries and in so many fields that it hardly seems credible that there are fewer observing Jews in the entire world than there are Kazakhs or Sri Lankans."

There is no doubt that Jews are a minority in virtually every country they reside in. Even Israel, the obvious counterexample, is only so on a superficial basis. For while Jews are a majority of this country, it is tiny compared to its neighbors, among whom the entire nation is in effect a small minority.

Nor is it rare that minorities would be persecuted. Indeed, Sowell (1998) is replete with cases wherein small populations are brutalized by larger ones.[25]

A thesis, then, that emanates from these considerations[26] is that the Jews have been victimized more often and more deeply than other high-earning and intellectually advanced groups, and this biases them in the direction of criticizing markets.

But it is unclear why a victimized minority would cleave to the left. Why not to the right, as have the Mormons, who are also a minority, and also have a history of suffering from persecution. Moreover, while to be sure the state of Israel is a minority among its larger national neighbors, this by no means holds true within that country itself. There, Jews are a majority. And yet the internal economic policies of Israel can hardly be considered market oriented (Gwartney, Lawson and Block, 1996).

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[24] This word is sometimes used to describe the home of the blacks in American inner cities in the northeast. But this is misleading. The Jews in Europe during those times were prohibited by law from living outside the areas specifically reserved for them. Nothing of this sort applied to blacks in northern American cities, certainly not after 1865.

[25] Although, see Diamond (1999), where the exact opposite occurs; namely, small advanced populations overcome ones that are less well economically developed. For a critique of this book, although not on this ground, see Block (2002b).

[26] I am not attributing this to Sowell.

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3.4 Intellectuals and Income Maximization

According to Rothbard (1973, pp. 66-67):

> "... why do the intellectuals need the state? Put simply, the intellectual's livelihood in the free market is generally none too secure; for the intellectual, like everyone else on the market, must depend on the values and choices of the masses of his fellow men, and it is characteristic of these masses that they are generally uninterested in intellectual concerns. The State, on the other hand, is willing to offer the intellectuals a warm, secure and permanent berth in its apparatus, a secure income, and the panoply of prestige."

And, further, Rothbard (1973, p. 69) declares: "This is not to say that all intellectuals everywhere have been 'court intellectuals,' servitors and junior partners of power. But this has been the ruling condition in the history of civilizations...."

This would definitely incline people of the Jewish community toward statism, not so much because of anything intrinsic to their religion, but simply because they are so heavily over-represented among the intellectual classes, and the latter have a predilection in favor of matters governmental. If intellectuals, in general, are drawn toward dirigisme out of considerations of income maximization, and Jews are disproportionately to be found among intellectuals, then this phenomenon alone could account for the leftist bias of that group.

Of course, it cannot be maintained that all employment enjoyed by intellectuals is in the formal civil service, either as professional civil servants or as political appointees. This consideration would lead us, presumably, to the conclusion that even if the direction of causation pointed out above were correct, it would still not explain much of the phenomenon under consideration. For there are other governmental jobs besides those in the bureaucracy. Teachers and professors in public institutions, for example, are intellectuals whose paychecks are based on tax revenues. And even those working in private universities are not totally unconnected to the state. For one thing, academics are dependent upon government largesse for fellowships, grants, contracts, etc. For another, given that with the exception of places such as Hillsdale, Patrick Henry and Grove City Colleges, a significant percentage of the

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budget of most ostensibly "private" institutions of higher learning is accounted for by government, it is only a slight exaggeration to say there are no universities not in the public sector.

But the rot spreads further than this, far further. If this explanation imparts to the *weltanschauung* of academia a leftist bias, it will tend to percolate to other intellectual redoubts, even if there is no direct connection between wealth maximization and the espousal of socialist nostrums. For example, take journalism, both reporting and editorial writing. If most academics favor dirigisme policies, then this applies, too, to professors in schools of journalism. If so, then their graduates likely reflect this political-economic perspective. And they, in turn, introduce the general newspaper reading public to this slant.[27]

3.5 Nazi Avoidance and Support for Non-white Immigration into Predominantly Homogeneous White Countries

There can be little doubt that the Jews have been seared by their exposure to Nazism. As a result, the rallying cry "never again" has become the motto of this community. There is one thing that distinguished National Socialist Germany from many countries: it was a predominantly homogeneous, Christian, white country; as a result, the Jews have determined that whatever else the U.S. and other Western countries[28] are and may become, they shall not resemble that demographic make-up (MacDonald, 1998). It is in this context that Jewish support for immigration from non-white countries, for multiculturalism, for institutions such as the NAACP, for affirmative action (which comes largely at the expense of male, white Christians as well as their own group) can be explained.

There is of course no necessary connection between this concern and socialism.[29] The world might well have been a place wherein the

[27] As two small, yet revealing, instances of this phenomenon, consider the fact that about 90% of the journalists covering the Nixon-McGovern presidential election favored the latter, while the former won in a landslide. Further, there is the almost total refusal of crime reporters to mention the race of perpetrators. See on this latter point Levin (1997).

[28] This also applies to other nations in which large numbers of Jews reside; e.g., Britain, France, etc.

[29] This does not apply to affirmative action when carried out on a coercive governmental basis, as opposed to being adopted by private interests, voluntarily. See on this Epstein (1992),

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desire for race-mixing had little or nothing to do with pro- or anti- free enterprise sentiment. To explore the reasons why this should have become a rallying cry of the left, not the right, would take us too far afield. Suffice it to say, however, that in the modern political context, there is little doubt that supporters of international socialism favor such policies, while nationalists do not (although international capitalists and neo-Conservatives do). Thus, this is yet another phenomenon that impels Jews in the direction of socialism, even though it stems from issues far removed from questions of economic freedom.

What can be reasonably said about this hypothesis? In my view, we can only say at this point that the jury is still out. It has at least superficial plausibility, in that it accords with the strictures of *quo bono*. That is, if it were true, this thesis does at least point to a gain that could be garnered by the Jewish community, acting in such a manner.

Speaking as a Jew myself, one who is reasonably cognizant of the events occurring in this community, I can say that I have never heard any reason to believe it is true. This hypothesis will be rejected by some, out of hand, as anti-Semitic. That is not at all the position I am taking. As a disinterested observer, as a social scientist, my role is to get that extra one inch closer to the truth. It is incompatible with this role to reject out of hand *any* hypothesis, no matter how despicable it may sound. All that can be said for this one, at the present time is that while Jews may conceivably have this motive, there is no evidence that they do, or that their actions have been motivated by it.

However, there is something that can be said against it. This hypothesis is rooted in Jewish experience with the long history of expulsions and persecution in so many European countries which reached a climax in Germany during World War II. Yet there are numerous countries that are at least as homogeneously white and Christian as Nazi Germany, and, also, Nordic for that matter, which have not spawned any anti-Jewish holocausts. Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and especially Denmark spring to mind. It is an interesting hypothesis, which cannot be rejected out of hand on *a priori* or "racist" grounds, but that does not mean we must accept it without question.

Block (1982), Block and Walker (1985), Williams (1982).

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4 Conclusion

We have come to no firm conclusions concerning the genesis of the support of the Jews for left-wing political economic philosophies. There can be no doubt as to the preference within this community for socialistic solutions to public policy challenges, but the causes thereof are less clear. This is an important issue for all those involved in such questions, since members of this religious group are leaders in the academic and intellectual activities concerned with U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Hopefully, these remarks will spark research into this fascinating area of study, and make some small contribution to eventually shedding more light on it.

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Appendix

Percentage of Jewish vote in U.S. presidential elections. Source: L. Sandy Maisel and Ira Forman, Eds., Jews in American Politics *(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 153. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/jewvote.html*

Year	*Democrat*		*Republican*		*Other*	
1928	Smith	72	Hoover	28		
1932	Roosevelt	82	Hoover	18		
1936	Roosevelt	85	Landon	15		
1940	Roosevelt	90	Wilkie	10		
1944	Roosevelt	90	Dewey	10		
1948	Truman	75	Dewey	10	Wallace	15
1952	Stevenson	64	Eisenhower	36		
1956	Stevenson	60	Eisenhower	40		
1960	Kennedy	82	Nixon	18		
1964	Johnson	90	Goldwater	10		
1968	Humphrey	81	Nixon	17		
1972	McGovern	65	Nixon	35		
1976	Carter	71	Ford	27		
1980	Carter	45	Reagan	39	Anderson	14
1984	Mondale	67	Reagan	31		
1988	Dukakis	64	Bush	35		
1992	Clinton	80	Bush	11	Perot	9
1996	Clinton	78	Dole	16	Perot	3
2000	Gore	79	Bush	19		

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President G.W. Bush and Missile Defense in the Aftermath of 9/11

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This article examines the issue of missile defense as a protective shield. The issue of missile defense is not new, but has ebbed and flowed from the political consciousness during the Cold War. The events of September 11th added impetus to missile defense, in that it raised public awareness that the United States was not defended from ballistic missile attack, even more so when those very missiles could be fitted with chemical, biological and nuclear warheads. In this chapter the issue of missile defense is examined in the context of the Cold War with the Strategic Defense Initiative through its metamorphosis into the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes during President Bush's administration. To its eventual formulation into the Ground-Based Missile Defense system developed under President G.W. Bush, and led to the politically sensitive decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in December 2001. The protective shield that missile defense promises appears finally to being achieved in Alaska.

Key Words: SDI; Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Brilliant Pebbles; GPALS; DAB; Strategic Defense Initiative Organization; Ballistic Missile Defense Organization; Missile Defense Act; National Missile Defense Act.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

The original task of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was to research the feasibility of a missile defense capable of breaking up a determined Soviet nuclear attack on the United States that could consist of thousands of nuclear weapons. This Phase I of the SDI program was to ensure that a large percentage of these nuclear weapons would be destroyed. Although the military requirements established for SDI in the Reagan Administration are classified, it has been reported that Phase I would have been able to shoot down 30 percent of all warheads fired in a first strike[2] and 50 percent of the warheads carried on the SS-

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[2] Hildreth, Stephen A., "The Strategic Defense Initiative: Issues for Phase I Deployment", *CRS Issue Brief*, (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, 1990), 4.

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18 Satan missile, whose combination of accuracy and yield made it the most dangerous counterforce threat in the Soviet arsenal.[3] This would mean that a Soviet war-planner could not successfully plan for a first strike, since he would be unsure of how effective his first strike could be. Phase I was to be only the start of a larger defense system, to meet possible changes in the Soviet threat.[4]

The SDI Mission

The SDI program from its conception in 1983 eventually changed its focus significantly. At first, it focused on the threat of a massive Soviet attack, but by 1991 it had switched to protection against much more limited strikes from anywhere on the globe. During each of these mission periods, there were significant changes to the program, based on policy reviews and decisions by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. The first phase and change to the SDI program began with the development of the technology period up until late 1987. The next major step that followed this period was Phase I with the Space Based Interceptor, and the final step before the switch to GPALS, was Phase I with Brilliant Pebbles.[5] Despite all these changes these steps were all known as Phase I, since they were intended to defend against a massive Soviet attack, although their architectures were subject to changes.

After Phase I was proposed, the SDIO began investigating a new, innovative space-based interceptor, known as "Brilliant Pebbles". These were to be a constellation of up to thousands of individual interceptors, each with its own surveillance capability and enough power to operate autonomously, within its own field of vision. Brilliant Pebbles was a competitor to the Space-Based Interceptor design concept, which was to house several interceptors together in a large "garage" or carrier vehicle. Brilliant Pebbles responded to the DAB concerns over the high cost of the Space Based Interceptor "garage" or carrier vehicle. Primarily,

[3] Ibid.

[4] J. D. Crouch II, "SDI and Securing Western Freedom", *Laissez-Faire*, Vol. 1 No. 4, Summer 1992, 17.

[5] Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, *Ballistic Missile Defense Evolution and Current Issues*, U.S. General Accounting Office, July 16, 1993, 22.

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however it allayed concerns relating to the survivability of the Space-Based Interceptor garage. Brilliant Pebbles was subjected to several technical feasibility reviews in 1989.

President Bush upon entering office in 1989, directed a National Security Review which was headed by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper.[6] This review, which was completed in spring 1990, endorsed the concept of Brilliant Pebbles and recommended its innovative approach be applied to the rest of the SDI Phase I architecture. In testimony before Congress in April 1990, the Director of the SDIO announced that Brilliant Pebbles had replaced both the Space-Based Interceptor and the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System in Phase I. In June 1990, the Under Secretary of Defense for acquisition endorsed the changes.

During the Reagan administration, it was the White House that set the most ambitious plans for missile defenses rather than the Pentagon, a reversal of the formulation of military space policy under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 1972

The period between 1972 and 1983 saw little ballistic missile defense activity in the United States. It was not until President Reagan's speech in March 1983 that the issue of the ABM Treaty rose to the fore. The SDI research and development program was conducted within the parameters of the Treaty.

President Bush's Global Protection Against Limited Strikes System

The change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship and more influentially the break-up of the Soviet empire caused a re-evaluation of the purpose of the SDI program. The SDI program was to be "refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source," which is not too dissimilar to that announced under the President G.W. Bush, however this system would have been capable of protecting not just the United States, but military forces overseas and allies.[7]

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[6] Ambassador Cooper subsequently served as Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, from July 1990 to January 1993

[7] J. D. Crouch II, "SDI and Securing Western Freedom", *Laissez-Faire*, Vol. 1 No. 4, Summer 1995, 18.J.D. Crouch was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

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> GPALS pares back America's SDI plans to meet the fiscal and military requirements of the 1990s. Unlike Reagan's SDI program, designed to disrupt a massive Soviet surprise attack involving thousands of incoming missiles, GPALS will give America – and its allies – a near-perfect defense against limited or perhaps accidental attacks by up to 200 missile warheads. GPALS then cuts the proposed costs of SDI from $53 billion to $41 billion over ten years. This puts SDI well within the cost-range of other important defense programs – less than the Air Force's B-2 Stealth bomber and comparable to the mobile Midgetman missile system.[8]

GPALS was designed to provide near-perfect protection against smaller strikes, potentially from a Third World foe or a fragmented Soviet Union. It was to be able to defend missile strikes of up to two hundred warheads[9] aimed at the U.S. from anywhere in the world with near 100 percent confidence.[10] This stands in contrast to the Phase I SDI mission which was developed under the Reagan Administration.

In January 1991, President Bush refocused the SDI program to deal with accidental or unauthorized launches of ballistic missiles and with deliberate attacks of limited scope. As President George Bush declared in his State of the Union Address:

> Looking forward, I have directed that the SDI program be refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source. Let us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the United States, to our forces overseas and to our friends and allies.[11]

Whilst the threat for GPALS was less technically stressing, the mission of near-perfect protection put additional stresses on designs. As the report to the Chairman on Governmental Affairs in the Senate

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Policy during 2000-2002.

[8]Baker Spring, "For Strategic Defense: A New Strategy for the New Global Situation", *Heritage Foundation*, April 18, 1991, 2.

[9]The figure of 200 warheads was used since this represents the number of warheads on a Russian SSBN.

[10]Ibid., 4.

[11]George Bush, , Presidential State of the Union Address, January 29, 1991.

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argued:

> High levels of protection require near perfect system performance in detecting, discriminating, and tracking targets; in battle management, command, control, and communications functions; and in intercepting and destroying targets.[12]

The Missile Defense Act in 1991 changed the shape and priorities of the GPALS program.[13] The act set goals for the early deployment of advanced theatre missile defenses and the initial site for the defense of the United States against limited attack. Congress gave the Department of Defense 180 days to develop a plan to meet its mandate for early deployment. It also mandated that Brilliant Pebbles space-based interceptors would not be part of initial planned deployments, but be pursued in "robust" research and development.[14]

In November 1991, the SDIO briefed the DAB's co-ordinating committee that the Theatre High Altitude Area Defense program, including the Theatre Missile Defense Ground-Based Radar, had high cost and schedule risks. SDIO was requested by the co-ordinating committee to develop acquisition strategy options to reduce risks. The Army and the SDIO subsequently modified the program, which consequently led to the DAB approving a milestone I entry[15] into demonstration and validation. DOD reviewers identified concurrency risks in meeting Congress's early fielding goals for an initial, single-site national missile defense system. After considering the DOD's assessment, Congress amended the Missile Defense Act in 1992, delaying the proposed fielding date. The 1992 Act continued the restrictions on the deployment of space-based interceptors.

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[12]Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, *Ballistic Missile Defense Evolution and Current Issues*, U.S. General Accounting Office, July 16, 1993, 30.

[13]The Missile Defense Act of 1991 will be discussed further in the next chapter.

[14]Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, *Ballistic Missile Defense Evolution and Current Issues*, U.S. General Accounting Office, July 16, 1993, 31.

[15]A milestone I entry determines whether a new acquisition program is warranted.If approved, establishes costs, schedule and performance objectives.

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One of the key elements of the refocused SDI program was the increased priority for the theatre missile defense programs. The experience in the Persian Gulf with the Patriot missile focused more attention on this priority. One of the objectives of the program was to focus on near-term deployment of improved theatre missile defense systems. This is an area where co-operation with allies could be expanded.

The refocusing of the original SDI mission of destroying around half of a mass raid involving several thousand re-entry vehicles launched out of the Soviet Union to protection of limited strikes meant a new architectural design. One of the elements was the Exo/Endo-atmospheric Interceptor, (E2I) which was to perform its intercepts high in the earth's atmosphere, after the re-entry vehicles were able to be distinguished from lighter decoys since the atmosphere causes distinct deceleration characteristics.[16]

The final component of the GPALS system was the space-based interceptor called Brilliant Pebbles. Each Pebble was to be an autonomous interceptor which could act independently once it had been authorized. "It basically looks and sees the ballistic missiles when they rise from their silos, or, in the case of a Scud, from a mobile launcher. At the appropriate time, it drops its 'life-jacket' and proceeds to manoeuvre into the oncoming path of the threat ballistic missile – or during the mid-course phase, of a re-entry vehicle transiting space."[17]

It was a misconception that Brilliant Pebbles could not be employed effectively to counter theatre ballistic missiles. If the range was greater than a few hundred miles, normal minimum energy trajectories would carry the RVs above the earth's atmosphere and there would be time to intercept them from space, using Brilliant Pebbles.[18] Such a system could be employed to counter the Scuds launched out of Iraq into Tel Aviv and Riyadh. The debris from such intercepts would probably burn-up when re-entering the earth's atmosphere rather than fall on city streets.

Space-based weapons remained essential since they would have

[16]Ibid., 17.

[17]Ibid., 18.

[18]Ibid.

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been far more effective than ground-based interceptors against missiles with multiple warheads. Ground-based interceptors must discriminate between warheads and decoys and then attack each of the warheads individually in space or as they re-enter the earth's atmosphere closing in on their targets. Brilliant Pebbles would not have needed to do this because it would destroy the one missile carrying the warheads and decoys.

Any warheads that slip through the Brilliant Pebbles net in space would have been intercepted by ground-based interceptors. Two ground-based interceptors were under consideration. It generally would attack only after the earth's atmosphere had stripped away the decoys. The challenge the E2I faced was ensuring that its on-board sensor would find the target warhead and direct the interceptor against it. This is tougher to accomplish inside the atmosphere than above it, since the speed of the incoming missile creates friction with the atmosphere that then creates extremely high heat. This heat distorts the view seen by the E2I's sensor as it "looks" through its window.

President Clinton's Missile Defense Policy

The Clinton administration in 1993 inherited the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes ballistic missile defense system and promptly cancelled the development of the system. The priority was placed on the development of theatre missile defense with national missile defense placed into research and development. This reorientation of missile defense policy was reflected in the name change in May 1993 from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, indicating the shift from strategic defense to theatre missile defense. The refocus was primarily to concentrate on ground-based defenses with a reduced effort towards national missile defense, however this led to a malaise for missile defense and like many policies during this period did not materialize into anything concrete.

The quest for a National Missile Defense of the United States was undertaken by the Republican controlled Congress. The Congressional attempts to legislate for a national missile defense gave rise to a number of Missile Defense Acts. The first of these was the Missile Defense Act of 1995. This act called for the deployment of a ground based National

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Missile Defense with multiple sites to be operational by 2003.[19] The act envisioned the deployment of up to one hundred ground-based interceptors, supported by space-based sensors.

The following year the Republican controlled Congress initiated the Defend America Act of 1996. The Defend America Act declared that it was the policy of the United States to deploy at the end of 2003 a National Missile Defense system that was capable of providing a highly effective defense against limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and would be augmented over time to provide a layered defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic missile threats as they emerged.[20] Unlike the Missile Defense Act of 1995, this act did not specify or explicitly restrict the United States to ground based systems; yet it did not explicitly challenge the ABM Treaty. The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the deployment of the proposed system would cost either thirty-one or sixty billion dollars, which led to the Defend America Act being withdrawn.[21] The attempt by the Republicans in the 1996 Presidential election year to make national missile defense a major issue during the campaign did not materialize. However, President Clinton and congressional Democrats had taken this issue seriously enough to adopt a compromise in the form of a deployment plan called the "3 plus 3" plan.

The National Missile Defense Act of 1999

The National Missile Defense Act of 1999 was passed with a veto proof majority. The 1999 NMD Act contained the following language

> It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and annual appropriation funds

[19] Thomas Moore, "The Missile Defense Act of 1995:The Senate's Historic Opportunity", *The Heritage Foundation*, August 1, 1995.

[20] *The Defend America Act of 1996*, (U.S. Government Printing Office:Washington D.C.), March 1996.

[21] Frances Fitzgerald, *Way Out There In The Blue:Reagan, Star Wars And The End of the Cold War*, (Simon & Schuster:New York, 2000), 493.

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for National Missile Defense.[22]

This majority was achievable with the publication in July 1998 of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the Untied States and its finding that the United States could face a ballistic missile threat from a third world country within the next five years with little or no warning, which was sooner than the National Intelligence Estimate had estimated. The report concluded that countries such as Iran and Iraq had been able to obtain technological assistance from other rogue countries and from industrialized countries with relaxed export controls. The CIA reaffirmed its assessment that no hostile country, with the possible exception of North Korea could acquire an ICBM before 2010. However, this was undermined in August 1998 when U.S. analysts were surprised by North Korea's test firing of a two-stage ballistic missile called Taepo Dong 1. The new exoatmospheric missile overflew northern Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean and traveled approximately 1, 500km.[23] Prior to this North Korea had only successfully test fired a single-stage missile. US intelligence had been anticipating the Taepo Dong 1 test, but they had believed that North Korea would have had a harder time in developing a two-stage vehicle.[24] The North Koreans subsequently claimed that they had been launching a satellite into orbit, which was confirmed by the Pentagon and State Department officials who announced that it was an attempt to launch a satellite with a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 booster.[25] The implication of the attempted launch is that if North Korea can orbit a satellite they can build an ICBM.

President G. W. Bush and Missile Defense

The missile defense funds authorized under the 2004 budget allocated sufficient funds to enable President Bush to build a 'placebo' missile defense shield and maintain a research and development

[22] National Missile Defense Act of 1999, 106th Congress, 1st session, House Resolution 4.

[23] Joseph C. Anselmo, "Missile Test Extends North Korea's Reach", *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 7, 1998, 56.

[24] Ibid.

[25] David A. Fulghum, "North Korea Space Attempt Verified", *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, September 21, 1998, 30.

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program into boost phase interception. This will enable the United States to defend itself from a missile attack of around 5-10 missiles. This is particularly aimed at the North Korean threat, and possibly Iran if they continue to develop increasingly longer range missiles such as the Sharab range.

The timing could be considered to be political since the missile defense system will be built around the time of the November elections. However, this argument is spurious since President Bush had a strong commitment to missile defense and the ABM Treaty had to be abandoned, which despite the rhetoric that the Bush administration did not particularly care for international agreements – the administration handled its withdrawal particularly adeptly, and managed not to alienate Russia and the PRC in the process. These diplomatic negotiations took time and this is one of the main factors that caused the building of the missile defense system to be built around the time of the November elections.

Indeed, the bulldozers started ground breaking in Alaska to start the construction of the missile defense system on the 13th June 2002, after the six months had elapsed since the United States had announced its intention to withdraw on 13th December 2001. In effect this meant that the missile defense system is being built to a timetable that could not possibly be improved upon and indeed the research development program into boost phase missile defense systems are scheduled to become operational by 2006. These include the Airborne Laser System, the Kinetic Energy Kill Vehicle and possibly the Navy boost-phase ascent system. The most likely of which to come to fruition are the Navy's Theater Wide system and US Air Force's ABL.

Conclusion

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

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Establishing a Moon Base and Exploring the Universe

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The author comments on a recent article by Klaus P. Heiss which advocated the establishment of a human colony on the moon both for tapping the wealth of the moon and as a base for manned space exploration and possible colonization at some future date. But while he finds the idea of a moon base to be plausible he expresses skepticism of human ability to ever establish colonies elsewhere in the universe.

Key Words: Space exploration; Manned moon base; Solar power; Extra-terrestrial life.

In his article "Tapping the Wealth of the Moon," (*JSPES*, Spring 2004, Vol. 29, No. 1, pages 3-64) Klaus P. Heiss makes an enthusiastic pledge for enhanced space exploration and especially for landings and work on the moon. The relatively short distance of the moon from the earth, its low gravity (1/6 of earth), the enhanced solar radiation (no atmosphere) and richness in ^{3}He (Helium 3) in the soil, are good reasons for regarding Heiss's proposals with favour. Also, the famous SPS (solar power satellite) could be serviced from a Moon-base. As a site for an inter-galactic observation station, the moon would serve as a starting point for a built-up of the SPS[2] as well as an observation station around the moon.[3]

Heiss describes with enthusiasm how the moon, as a firm and near-earth platform, can be used for extended, astronomic and astrophysics data acquisition. Without a dense atmosphere, the far side of this natural earth-satellite is the ideal place for intergalactic space observation through the entire frequency spectrum and with much more elaborate and extended technical means than is possible on small earth bound satellites like the Hubble-spectroscope.

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[2] Glaser: P.E.. The potential of satellite solar power. Proceed.IEEE,65(8) 1162, 1977

[3] H.F.Mataré and P.Faber: "Renewable Energies";VDI-Springer Verlag 1993, p.101

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Another obvious advantage of a Moon basis is the abundance of energy, either in the form of solar radiation or from the use of the ample supply of Regolith, which is the superficial, stony surface layer that has accumulated Helium 3 over eons of time.

It has been pointed out that also the 1.3 kW/m^2 of solar energy on the moon is more than a thousand times the value on the earth-surface beneath the earth's dense atmosphere.

In using the supply of ^{3}He for fusion, one could imagine that the Moon would serve as an ideal platform for fusion reactors. The advantage of fusion with ^{3}He, Heiss points out, lies in the fact that the by-product is not volatile Tritium but Deuterium. It is to be mentioned here though, that the ignition- or threshold-temperature is about twice as high in the first case: 100 keV as compared to 50 keV in the D + D reaction.[4]

Heiss points out correctly that a number of important sensing observations for stellar radiation from Gamma-rays to the infrared could best be situated on the Moon surface and operate more safely than in orbiting satellite spectroscope laboratories.

It is also true that we may expect to witness a further build-up of earth observatories on the Moon to replace part of the fragile satellite relays, be it for agricultural, atmospheric, magnetic measurements or for information, television or industrial communications. In particular, the operation of an SPS in geostationary orbit could bring energy to the remotest areas of the globe and fill a particular need in the Third World countries, where industrialization and agriculture depend on available energy; this especially with modern compound crystal solar cells with over 30% efficiency.[5]

But with all the optimism for a power satellite, practical and difficult questions about the best way to transfer this energy to the earth must be answered. There were conflicting views about the system to convert solar radiation to microwave radiation and to use a dipole antenna to beam the microwaves to earth, where a rectifying antenna (rectantenna) on

[4] H.F.Mataré: „Energy, Facts and Future", CRC-Press, Florida, 1989 p.96

[5] A.R.Martin; "Satellite Power Systems. Promise and Perspective." SPS 91; Paris 1991 p.65 and Mataré p.411.

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the ground would transfer the energy to lower frequency. Here the difficult question arises: how much of a field strength can be allowed to pass through the atmosphere? There were heated debates about the dangerous effects of microwaves on humans when a microwave uplink facility was built in Rockaway N.J. in 1980 . In this case the intensity was in the 0.005 mWatt/cm^2 range! But a reasonably dimensioned rectantenna should at least receive one mWatt / cm^2.[6] Here the danger for airplanes or birds getting into the power beam is obvious. That is the reason why, in discussions about the best location for such rectantennas (on mountainous areas) we could not agree on any specific area in the whole USA.

But Human Space Exploration is a Different Matter

Optimism is necessary for any groundbreaking, new technology, and one must share the optimism of Heiss for a Moon basis, but Heiss´s optimism with respect to human space exploration far beyond the Moon and into interstellar space to other planets, is another matter entirely. Heiss thinks, it should be the goal of humanity to outgrow this planet and to form new colonies on other planets and to declare "independence" from earth (a new type of "declaration of independence"). This is certainly not as easy as it sounds. A goal like this ignores a few basic facts. This position forgets the whole complex history of a biologically benign planet. Within the billions of years of existence of a planet, the right amount of solar radiation, an atmosphere, oxygen, the possibility of organic life etc. exists, if at all, for a duration of just a few million years during the lifetime of billions of years of a planet. This is comparable to the duration of a few minutes in the lifetime of a human of 80 years of age.

The search for a planet suitable for human colonization in the "neighbourhood," i.e., within the Milky Way, is not just a question of finding other suns with planets. The problem is the same, or even more difficult, than what is called: "Project SETI" (Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence). In discussing a book by Stephen Webb on this subject[7], Jill

[6] G.R.Woodcock: Economics of Lunar resources for Solar Power satellites." SPS-91;Paris 1991 P.194

[7] Stephen Webb: "If the Universe is Teeming with Aliens Where is Everybody?"

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Tarter[8] concludes that the search has not covered sufficient sky for a conclusion, yes or no to the Fermi question: "If the Universe is teeming with Aliens, where is everybody?" Since Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stakes by the Catholic Church around 1600 because he maintained that there were other inhabited planets, the consensus is that, indeed, there must be other planets with biological developments similar to that on earth. So, goes the logic, there must be humans who communicate (d) by radio waves which must reach us here. The SETI project has been running for ten years without success so far. A newer report[9] states that a search for "near earth" star systems only 150 Light Years distant with the Arecibo antennas in Puerto Rico found no intelligent signals. Here powers of 10,000 Watts may be sufficient to cover the distance. Can one conclude from generally known data that the "Teeming" is quite possible but that a communication in any way is impossible? The answer is "yes". A few considerations may illuminate this conclusion:

There is a general way to estimate for the number of near earth planets. Let us start with the total number of galaxies as derived within the Hubble length:

$n^*(c/Ho)^3 = 3 \times 10^8$ galaxies (Peebles)

Ho = 55 km/s/Mps; 1 Mps = 3.3×10^6 LY ; LY (light year);. c = $3x10^5$ km/sec

Each galaxy has of the order of 10^9 stars. Thus, all galaxies together have 3×10^{17} stars and among them, let us assume 10 planets/star, a figure derived from our own solar system. This results in a rough figure of 3×10^{18} planets. From this figure it is logical to assume 1 per mil or 10^{15} planets to have conditions, sufficient for development of life, like: solar radiation to keep the average surface temperature in the range – 10 to + 40 C and an oxygen carrying atmosphere as well as water. This sets stringent conditions also for the mass of the planet and its ability to attract/keep a gaseous, oxygen-carrying atmosphere. The average

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Copernicus-Springer Verlag: 2002.

[8] Jill Tarter: "Ongoing Debate over Cosmic Neighbors," SCIENCE, 3.Jan.2003,p.46

[9] Richard A.Kerr: "No Din of Alien Chatter in our Neighborhood"; SCIENCE Vol 303, 2/20; 2004. page 1133

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distance from earth of this specific type of planet must be assumed to lie in the range of 10^7 to 10^9 light years. One must consider this as an optimistic assumption. Thus, any communication delay between an inhabited planet and earth is of the order of 10 million to 1 billion years. If there is a planet with organic life, it has a lifetime of some 10^9 years. As on earth, there are certainly several "short" organic developments e.g. from fossil eukariotes to reptiles and mammals etc., each some 10^7 years of duration. The duration of the existence of a developed human being is only 1/1000 of the time of possible, organic life on such a planet.

With the long telecommunication delay, signals from a distant planet could reach planet earth only long after life on that planet had ceased. During their active period, such inhabitants would have to have created strong radio sources to announce their existence, much stronger than needed for inter-planet communications. These distances actually require radiation power as emerging from synchrotron radiation sources, in the 1000 MeV range. But human equipment works in the 1 to 10 electron-Volt range, in any case not over 10^{-6} of the power from star collisions. Human signal transmission has so far covered distances from earth to Saturn, a minuscule distance, compared to the distances to be covered in this case. Sensitivities of the best centimetre microwave receivers are in the range of 10^6 to 10^7 kT (k = Boltzmann constant; T = abs. temperature) or 10^{-9} to 10^{-10} Watts.[10] One has to assume that the power of the microwave signal decreases with the distance cube as a consequence of dark matter absorption. To result in a measurable signal after covering distances of say only 1000 LY or 10^{16} km, the signal strength must be in the range of the power of star events i.e. over 10^{20} Watts, well above any earth-like equipment ever known. In addition, the probability that there is coincidence of human capability on two planets is practically nil, as synchronization of both short periods of human-like existence during the planets lifetimes is only 1/1000 or less of the possible interval of the planet´s lifetime of some 10^9 years. Also, travel near light speed would still take a billion years, much too long for any organic structure to survive.

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[10] H.F.Mataré: "Receiver Problems in the UHF-Range", Oldenbourg, Munich 1951

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Conclusion

There are possibly a billion planets similar to earth in the "near" universe and surely, thousands with organic life and also human-like organisms (Giordano Bruno´s Proposition was certainly correct) but their average distance, even in the near universe, make it impossible to connect to anyone of the inhabitants of these planets, especially as the life span of a developed human is only a short portion of the overall existence of life on such planets. The probability of a coincidence of this short period on two planets, make communication even more remote, not to mention the enormous signal power needed to cover such distances. Even more remote is a voyage of humans and all their biological conditions over thousands of light years! Instead, humanity has to organize this planet pragmatically, avoid overpopulation and improve on the quality of life.

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Country Creativity and IQ

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The author presents evidence of the link between intelligence, freedom, creativity, and the prosperity of nations, and emphasizes the need for this information to be taken into consideration when formulating public policy.

Key Words: Intelligence; Freedom; Creativity; Economic growth; Developing nations.

Creativity and innovation are the backbone of economic growth. Schumpeter lauded the entrepreneur's primary role for economic growth and development. Most principles of economics textbooks, in addition to capital, labor, and land, typically single out entrepreneurial ability as a factor of production. Recently, Richard Florida, in his book, *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002), argues that the key to prosperity of any locality is its ability to attract creative people.

It would seem to be an irrefutable proposition that a minimum level of intelligence is a necessary condition for creativity. Great advances that have benefited mankind have invariably come from the activities and undertakings of gifted people. It is surely an intuitively appealing proposition that greater mental capability, given the opportunity, given the freedom to express itself, leads to greater economic creativity. If this is the case, then differences in IQ scores across countries will be a source of differences in economic creativity between countries.

This paper looks at the relationship between creativity and intelligence across nations using recently available data on average IQ scores across the world. Specifically, the paper uses cross country regression analysis to look at the relationship between country creativity and country IQ, and between country creativity, country IQ and country freedom. The paper is divided into four sections. The first section puts forth the case as to why intelligence is important for creativity. The

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second section discusses the new cross country IQ data and new creativity data that are now available. The third section shows the results of cross country regressions of country creativity and its components on IQ alone and on IQ in combination with the degree of freedom prevailing in a country. Finally, the fourth section provides a brief conclusion along with some policy implications.

I. The Relevance of Modern Intelligence[2]

Let me once again relate an often told story. Why has man not only survived as a species but been extremely successful as a species? Billions of people now populate the globe. Is it because man is endowed with greater strength, superior speed, or better natural armor than other species? Does he have the strength of a lion, the speed of a gazelle, or the built in protection of a turtle? No, it is because of his brain. It is his brain power than gives man the advantage over other species. Indeed, his cerebral superiority gives man the power to dominate other species. With his great mental acuity comes inventiveness, innovativeness, the ability to creatively solve problems, the proficiency to bring technology to bear on problems, and to invent new technology whatever and whenever the situation demands.

Within the human species proper, between organized groups, intellect is important as witnessed by the ultimate clash of war. Superior technical intelligence generally determines which side is ultimately victorious. Keeping ahead on the technology front, in the technology race, is crucial. The invention of the catapult makes castle strongholds obsolete. The coming of the long bow puts those who do not have it at a decisive disadvantage. Improved organizational forms, the implementation of superior strategies, the fruits of mental power, give one side an advantage over the other.

In economic completion between individuals, mental power plays a crucial role. In a free labor market, wages are determined by productivity. Individuals with higher productivity will receive greater wages than individuals with lower productivity. A prime reason for differences in individual productivity leading to differences in wages is differences in

[2] NB., Psychologists disagree as to whether intelligence is a unitary or a multiple quality, and we note that the author opts for the multiple theory. - *Editors*

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individual ability between individuals.

Differences in non-wage income between individuals are also due in part to differences in intellectual ability. To have a vision of a new product or service, and the organizational skill to make the vision come true certainly requires above average talent.

What distinguishes modern society from its predecessors, and, for that matter, in the contemporary world, what distinguishes highly advanced countries from their less fortunate counterparts? Is it the focus on religion, as may have been the case in Western Europe during medieval times, or, the emphasis on the noble warrior, as in the Samurai class of old Japan? No, of course, it is not any of these. The defining feature of modern culture is the application of science, the conscious and purposeful application of intelligence, to technology, and, the willingness to adapt to technological change whatever it requires and wherever it leads. A successful modern nation tries to make the speed of technological advance as rapid as possible, and pushes the human being's ability to adjust to the disruptions brought about by technological progress to the utmost limit.

Intelligence in the modern sense is important both for its effect in contributing to technological change, and because it enables individuals to adapt to technological change. Technological change, although beneficial in raising output per capita, is almost always disruptive. The introduction and spread of the automobile did havoc to the blacksmith industry. In addition, the greater the speed pf technological change, the bigger the structural changes it engenders, and the greater is the need for members of society to adapt.

The measurement of intelligence is a modern phenomenon. It dates only back to Francis Galton in the late eighteen hundreds. The presupposition in this paper is that IQ measures modern intelligence, the form of intelligence needed in a modern technological economy. What does it mean to change from a primitive to a modern society? It certainly entails a change in the way people think. There is little question that that there are different types of intelligence and different ways of thinking. The clerical hierarchy of medieval times, fixed in the belief of the unimportance of the present world, may have been extremely adept at understanding the intricacies of theology. However,

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if they were brought back from the dead and transported to the present to take a modern IQ test, they would probably fair poorly. They certainly have intelligence, but not the appropriate kind of modern thinking.

Different societies socialize individuals differently. Culture determines the type of intelligence that is fostered and the use of the intelligence. Cultures can inhibit or even completely stifle the modern creativity process. For instance, if, in the extreme, a traditional society believes the ways of doing things, the techniques, handed down by its ancestors are sacred, the brain power and intelligence for modifying and creating new techniques is not going to be developed. Even if an exceptional individual in such a society somehow overcomes his internal taboo and guilt to consider, to formulate, and eventually to adopt a novel technique, he still faces the real possibility of social ostracism, physical punishment, or death from social sanctions.

Previous results show that Intelligence is a factor accounting for differences in income between individuals and between countries. Lynn and Vanhanen, using their average country IQ data, find a positive correlation separately exists across countries between IQ and four different variables, real GDP per capita, real GNP per capita, short-term growth of real GDP per capita, and long-term growth of GDP per capita (Lynn and Vanhannen 2002). Using the National Longitudinal Study of Youth, Murray finds a positive correlation between an individual's adolescent IQ and their early adult income (Murray 1998). Similarly, Jenson finds a positive association between childhood IQ and adult income (Jenson 1998).

II. The New Cross-Country Data on National Creativity and IQ

Two recent firsts in data collection enable us to undertake, for the first time, empirical analysis to study the potential relationship that may exist between creativity and intelligence *across countries*.

The first of these two fortuitous data happenings is that, for the first time, the World Economic Forum publishes indexes on creativity and its component parts across countries in *The Global Competitiveness Report 2000*. The second key data event is that, for the first time, a cross country data set consisting of average IQ scores by country is compiled by Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhannen in their book, *IQ and the Wealth*

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of Nations (2002).

The World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report 2000 provides data on creativity and its four component parts, innovation, technology, technology transfer, and startups, for 59 countries. The data set is based on answers obtained from a survey questionnaire.

The creativity index attempts to measure both the innovative activity within a country and its success in borrowing technology from other countries. In 2000, the creativity index varied from a low of -1.55 for Bolivia to a high of 2.02 for the United States.

The innovation index, the first component index from which the overall creativity index is derived, ranges in value from a low of -1.84 for Bolivia to a high of 2.02 for the United States.

The second component of the creativity index is a startup index. It measures the extent of entrepreneurial activity in the country in the form of new business startups. Its high value in 2000 is 2.02 (United States) and its low value is -2.01 (Ecuador).

Technology is the third component index of the overall creativity index. Its aim is to measure the total technology available to a country regardless of whether the technology is internally generated or imported from abroad. In 2000, Bolivia scores lowest on the technology index with a value of -2.59. The United States scores the highest value with a value of 2.02.

The technology transfer, the last component part of the overall creativity index, tries to measure the extent a country adopts technology from other countries. It varies from a low value of -2.59 for Russia to a high value of 1.95 for Singapore in 2000.

Lynn and Vanhannen's IQ data set contains IQ scores for 185 countries. They are based on the various and assorted IQ tests that have been previously administered in different countries. In countries for which IQ data is unavailable, they estimate the IQ scores for the countries using neighboring countries for which IQs are known. Whenever tests for different countries occur at different times, the Lynn and Vanhannen IQ scores are adjusted for the upward drift that typically occurs in IQ scores over time. There is substantial variation in the Lynn and Vanhannen IQ scores across countries and between regions. With the data standardized by giving the U.K. an IQ score of

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100, the average IQ score across countries for the entire world is 90.

III. Cross Country Regressions of Creativity and its Component Parts on IQ

Combining the Lynn and Vanhanen's country IQ scores with the World Economic Forum's county creativity indexes leads to a total of 56 countries for which data is available for both IQ and creativity.

Table I shows the results of simple cross country regression runs of creativity and its component parts on IQ. The first row is a descriptive row, while each remaining row represents a regression run.

The first column identifies the dependent variable, creativity or one of its component parts, in a regression equation. For each of the five equations, the second column shows the statistical output for the constant, and the third the output for average country IQ. The topmost value for table cells in the second and third columns is the estimated coefficient for an equation. This is followed by the t-statistic in parentheses. If a variable in an equation significant at the one percent level of significance or better, then it is given one asterisk. If it is significant at the five percent level of significance or better, then it is given two asterisks, and, if it is significant at the ten percent level or better, then it is given three asterisks. The fourth column shows the number of countries (N) entering an equation, and the final column the r-squared value (RSQ).

The results lend support to the hypothesis that country creativity is positively related to county IQ. In four of the five equations, average IQ is positive and significant at the one percent level or better, and, even in the worst case, when TECHTRAN, the technology transfer index, is used as the dependent variable; IQ is significant at the ten percent level or better.

IQ on its own explains twenty four and a half percent in the cross country variation in overall creativity (CREATE). Looking at creativity's component parts, it explains thirty three percent of the variation in innovation (INNOVATE), close to nineteen percent of the variation in startups (STARTUP), near twenty five percent of the variation in technology (TECH), and a little over a half of a percent of the variation in technology transfer (TECHTRAN).

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Perhaps even the less robust results for IQ in the technology transfer equation are even explainable. The poorer results for IQ in technology transfer may simply be due to substitution between domestically produced creativity and imported creativity. While high average country IQ increases a country's ability to transfer technology from another country, it also reduces its need to import technology from abroad, because higher IQ so enhances a country's own creativity.

TABLE I
Simple Cross Country Regressions of Creativity and its Component Parts on Country IQ

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONSTANT	IQ	N	RSQ
CREATE	-4.97 (-4.00) *	.056 (4.19) *	56	.245
INNOVATE	-6.68 (-5.17) *	.071 (5.16) *	56	.330
STARTUP	-5.01 (-3.53) *	.053 (3.52) *	56	.187
TECH	-4.95 (-3.87) *	.058 (4.25) *	56	.251
TECHTRAN	-2.79 (-1.80) ***	.030 (1.80) ***	56	.057

While high IQ gives a country the potential capability for creativity, an additional factor is also important. It is the amount of freedom existing in a country. The extent of freedom in a country determines the degree to which creativity is not shackled, and, thereby, has the opportunity to flourish and express itself

Freedom House, in *Freedom in the World,* annually publishes an index on political rights and on civil liberties for countries around the world. Both indexes vary from a low value of one to a high value of seven. The indexes are inverted with lower values indicating greater

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political rights and civil liberties for a country and higher values indicating lesser political rights and civil liberties for a country.

Based on these indexes an overall freedom index for countries was constructed using the formula:

$$FREEDOM = 49 - PR * CL,$$

where FREEDOM is the overall freedom index, and PR and CL are Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties indexes respectively. FREEDOM varies from a low value of zero to a high value of 49 with higher values indicating greater levels of freedom for a country.

Table II shows multiple regressions of running creativity and its components on both country IQ and on FREEDOM. It is constructed in an analogous fashion to table I. Due to missing values, by adding FREEDOM to the creativity equation, there is, unfortunately, a one country reduction in the number of observations.

TABLE II

Cross Country Regressions of Creativity and its Component Parts on Country IQ and Country Freedom

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONSTANT	IQ	FREEDOM	N	RSQ
CREATE	-5.12 (-4.10) *	.048 (3.46) *	.022 (2.14) **	55	.294
INNOVATE	-7.25 (-5.75) *	.067 (4.78) *	.025 (2.47) **	55	.417
STARTUP	-4.87 (-3.45) *	.042 (2.66) **	.023 (2.03) **	55	.222
TECH	-5.37 (-4.17) *	.054 (3.80) *	.020 (1.90) ***	55	.309
TECHTRAN	-2.78 (-1.72) ***	.027 (1.50)	.007 (.500)	55	.056

Looking at table II shows that, with the inclusion of the country

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freedom variable, FREEDOM, IQ remains positive in all the creativity equations, and, is significant at the five percent level of significance or better in all but the unusual TECHTRAN equation. With regard to the freedom variable itself, once again, except for TECHTRAN, FREEDOM is positive and significant at the five percent level of significance or better in every one of the creativity equations, and its addition augments the r-squared value of each equation.

IV. Conclusion

The findings of the cross country analysis of this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that higher country IQ is associated with greater country creativity. With the exception of technology transfers, whether IQ is used in isolation or in combination with country freedom, to explain creativity and its component parts, IQ is positive and statistically significant. On its own, IQ explains nearly a quarter of the variation in overall creativity for the 56 countries included in this study.

The finding that IQ is so important for creativity means that nationally and internationally we should do everything in our power to bolster IQ. Higher IQ leads to greater creativity, and, consequently, to greater economic growth. Economic growth leads to the reduction in the threat to survival, reduced anxiety, better nutrition, improved educational opportunities, and, in its train, higher IQ.

Throughout the globe, the virtuous circle between IQ and economic activity needs to be nourished and fostered. Cultural barriers to the growth of national IQ need to be eliminated or reduced. In developing countries, nutrition needs to be sustained at a level adequate for brain power to flourish, and the brain drain from emigration needs to be short circuited. In a host of the highly developed countries facing aging demographics, such as Japan and the countries of Western Europe, research needs to be aimed at reducing the detrimental effects on IQ of aging. Futuristically, new ways of augmenting brain power, through pharmacology, neurology, cybernetics, and by other scientific means, needs to be developed and promoted by government policy.

Both the software and the hardware of the brain need to be promoted. Educational opportunities ought to become widely available. Both the quantity and the quality of education need to be improved.

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Ultimately, from scientific endeavors engaged in tinkering with the size and structure of the brain, who knows what unimagined new brain properties and functions may be uncovered for the future good of man.

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Book Reviews

Intelligence, Race, and Genetics:
Conversations with Arthur R. Jensen
Frank Miele
Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado and Oxford, England, 2002

In 1969 the respected *Harvard Educational Review*, published a sensational 123 page article which made history and changed the course of research and debate in the area of intelligence, the heritability of intelligence, and its essential relevance not only to academic achievement but also to the likelihood of success in life. This renowned paper was entitled "How can we Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement," and it appeared at a time when America was struggling to raise the economic level of its substantial black minority by an extensive range of educational programs and policies, as few of these seemed to be having much effect. Written by a 46 year old Berkeley psychologist, who was already well-known in his discipline, this momentous, almost book length article convincingly showed that intelligence was in the largest part genetically controlled, and that although improvements in environmental conditions could undoubtedly raise a child's academic performance, when environmental circumstances were equal, substantial differences in intelligence and intellectual ability often remained and that these were determined by heredity.

The author of this paper, Arthur R. Jensen, had already published extensively in related areas of psychology, but from that time on he became one of the best known names in American academia. Vehemently attacked by a few, but increasingly accepted and respected by a majority of his colleagues, Jensen continued to research and publish in this area, so that he is now the author of more than 400 books and articles, on intelligence, educational psychology, and individual and group differences. Frank Miele's recent book is an excellent introduction to the role of heredity in determining human behavior, since it surveys Jensen's current views on the subject as developed in a further 45 years of research and publishing since that momentous *HER* article

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appeared.

The first chapter clarifies for the layman the nature of IQ. Aside from the obvious fact that the Intelligence Quotient is a figure that reflects our ability to perform efficiently in IQ tests, it is well established that persons with a high IQ tend to be more successful throughout their careers. Known as *g* (for general mental ability) intelligence is a property of the brain that is linked to the individual's ability to perform all kinds of cognitive tasks. An individual's ability to perform specific tasks that are not purely cognitive is affected by a range of special abilities, but intelligence is of paramount importance in any task that requires reasoning ability.

Jensen's rise to fame was rooted in his ability, through an extensive survey of the literature, to advance the study of the relationship between IQ and heredity beyond the level achieved by earlier exponents of the genetic basis of intelligence. Jensen's views on this important topic are synopsized by Miele and presented in the chapter entitled, 'Nature, Nurture, or Both?' The many studies of twins that have been conducted show clearly that the IQ of identical twins (who by definition share virtually 100% of their genes), reared in the same environment (life history cannot be exactly the same for any two individuals no matter how similar the environment), correlates to the level of .86. By comparison, the IQ of twins reared in separate families (in some instances studied, even in different countries) still correlates at the level of .78. And by contrast, the IQ of siblings, who share only 50% of their genes, correlates at .47 if raised in the same home, and only .24 when reared apart. Other case studies show that the intelligence of parents tends to correlate to the level of .42 with that of their natural children raised at home but at the level of only .19 with the intelligence of children they have adopted and raised in their home.

If IQ is genetically controlled to the level of around 70%, as determined by Jensen and others, then it is simply a matter of logic to ask whether persons from different gene pools or populations may well differ in IQ, just as they differ in other inherited qualities. This is a question that at first raised furious controversy, although extensive testing has demonstrated that it is in fact the case and extensive testing has shown that the average IQ of different human populations can vary

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by as much as 20%. This could be explained by the evidence that about 20% of IQ appears to be due to non-genetic, environmental variants (diet, disease, educational opportunity). However, it has also been demonstrated that persons belonging to different gene pools or biological populations may still differ substantially in IQ when raised, in similar environmental conditions.

It is in the chapter entitled 'What is Race?' that the significance of this last study is revealed. Psychometric testing has shown that races differ statistically in their behavioral abilities in respect of mental abilities as well as in a very broad range of other abilities. Jensen points out that there is much confusion of thought on this area because the term race can be defined in different ways. In the biological sense, a race is subspecies. But whilst biologists define species as animal populations that are infertile when crossed with members of other species, and subspecies as populations that have evolved separately to the point that they differ in various biological ways but have not yet lost the ability to crossbreed, feral animal subspecies do not customarily attempt to crossbreed, and therefore most animal subspecies are quite as distinct from each other as species – even though the are biologically capable of cross-breeding.

By contrast, biologically different human populations do often crossbreed when in contact with each other and are therefore regarded as subspecies, although in other traits they may differ from each other quite as much as some animal populations that are recognized as different species. Consequently, when speaking of human populations, it is better to employ Jensen's alternative definition of race: breeding populations that differ from each other in the frequencies of one or more genes. Although the boundaries of human races are very "fuzzy," Jensen says that the distinctions become clear when "you feed these genetic distance measures into a statistical procedure called principal component analysis."

Citing recent studies by various geneticists, Jensen explains that the major evolutionary/genetic distance between existing human populations is between the cluster of [sub-Saharan] African populations and all others, and then – amongst the non-African populations – between all others and the aboriginal Australoid/New Guinea cluster. Many of the

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diverse peoples of the Pacific Islands and of South East Asia tend to be closer to the Australoid/New Guinea division than are other human populations, whilst the Mongoloids of northeast Asia, the Arctic populations and the American Indians are closer to each other than they are to the populations of Europe, Southwest Asia and South Asia.

Miele then directs the discussion to the publication *The Bell Curve*, which is heavily based on Jensen's research. This created something of a sensation when published, because it popularized Jensen's work and pointed to the socio-political policy implications of any recognition of the innate, genetic basis of intelligence. Miele also devotes a full chapter to explicating Jensen's own views on what genetic disparities in human mental ability mean for social and political policies under the title "Science and Policy: What's to be done?" In this, Jensen expresses the view that Affirmative Action policies which advance persons of lesser intelligence over others who are cognitively more competent is harmful and unfair. Advocating a level playing field, but supporting policies that are designed to ensure that all persons do have the opportunity to compete on a level playing field, he condemns "reverse discrimination" while stressing that competition to succeed should be based on individual abilities, not on race. However, he is particularly concerned about the vast explosion of population around the world, and particularly in the Third World, and by the fact that almost everywhere it seems to be the less intelligent who are producing the most children, while socio-economic and cultural factors are bringing about a decline in the birthrate amongst those of higher intellectual ability. This, combined with the international brain drain which is increasingly drawing the more intelligent individuals to migrate to countries which are more prosperous because of the higher IQ of their populations, is likely to accentuate the plight of the Third World countries. At the same time he points out that the present migratory movements are not restricted to the more intelligent, and that no First World country can afford to have open borders to migrants from the Third World, for fear of being swamped by migrants of lower intelligence.

Reading and digesting this powerful and informative book, one can readily perceive why Robert Plomin of the Institute of Psychiatry, King's College, London, described this volume as "an excellent introduction,

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overview and update about the man and the science behind the 'ism' of Jensenism. In clear and candid dialogue, Jensen unflinchingly answers hard questions about the policy implications of his life's work," However, this reviewer would regard Plomin's comment as overly cautious praise. In our opinion, it certainly fits Plomin's description, but we would go further and say that any reader will find it to be a highly intelligible, powerful and extremely informative book.

Ian McNish

Where the Right Went Wrong:
How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency
Patrick J. Buchanan
St. Martin's Press, 2004

This is another controversial but unquestionably significant book by Patrick Buchanan, whose writings always provide provocative but thoughtful discussions of current social, political and cultural issues.

Each of his most recent three books prior to this one has dealt with an issue that is critical to the existence of the United States in anything like its present form. *The Great Betrayal* discusses the hollowing-out of the American economy by a deindustrialization that is well underway and that has come from what Buchanan sees as a slavish devotion to Free Trade ideology in the context of a global economy where business enterprise will move about the world seeking the lowest labor costs regardless of what that does to the American workforce and manufacturing base. *A Republic, Not an Empire* examines the change that occurred in American foreign policy in 1898 when the United States shifted from its historic policy of leadership-by-example to a philosophy of benevolent imperialism through which the United States would undertake to be the policeman and social worker of the world. In common with Samuel Huntington, he sees this global interventionism as both morally presumptuous and highly dangerous, inviting resentment from those who prefer to make their own decisions and live within their own cultures. Accordingly, he sees it as a key motivating factor behind the Islamist radicalism that has declared war upon the United States. In

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the most recent book, *The Death of the West*, Buchanan tells of the existential crisis for Western civilization that is rapidly taking form because of declining birth rates in Europe and America combined with massive immigration from the Third World.

Where the Right Went Wrong contains a lucid and detailed explanation of each of these three crises, in effect summarizing the material brought out in the preceding three books. Because of the nature of the crises, it would be a serious mistake for a reader to suppose from the title that the book is a discussion of a narrowly sectarian matter that is of interest only to members of what he calls "the American Right".

It is Buchanan's thesis that America's erstwhile "conservatism" is now supplanted by forces that are so fragmented, so steeped in illusion, and so lacking in appropriate ideas that a "conservative movement" in any meaningful sense has ceased to exist. Despite much unhappiness among those directly impacted by downsizing and outsourcing, an unalloyed doctrine of Free Trade has become the conventional wisdom in the United States – and offers simply "more of the same" as the shift of work and enterprise to outside the country continues. The Wilsonian gospel of "making the world safe for democracy" is repeated as a mantra, and draws the American people into ever-more commitments. And in the name of "multiculturalism," the existing political elites within the United States and Europe welcome the demographic flushing-out of a civilization that heretofore has been profoundly European.

Buchanan concludes the book with a call to those who share his insights to stay within the Republican Party, keeping their standing there for the purpose of waging a struggle for control of the party in the future, just as years ago the Goldwater and Reagan Republicans did in wresting the party away from the Rockefeller Republicans. Whether such a profound reorientation of today's party is possible, given the ideological fragmentation that impedes coalescence on an alternative, seems to this reviewer extremely doubtful. On the other hand, those who wish for a total defeat of Bush and the Republican Congress so that a "new American mainstream party" can rise from the ashes are almost certainly indulging in just as much wishful thinking. The root of the problem lies in the fact that most "mainstream" Americans don't read serious books, and hence give themselves no access to ideas beyond

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those they already hold or are presented to them on television or in the mainstream media.

The American Right, as identified by Buchanan, has long consisted of a variety of philosophically divergent factions. These were held together by the anti-Communist imperative during the Cold War, so much so that the divisions were hardly visible. But victory in the Cold War, Buchanan says, spelled the beginning of the end for that coalition.

To Buchanan, the most proximate cause of the ensuing fragmentation and dissolution has been the ascendancy of the "neoconservatives." This gives rise to his subtitle: "How Neoconservatives Subverted the Reagan Revolution and Hijacked the Bush Presidency." During recent years, neoconservatives are widely recognized as having come to occupy the commanding heights of the erstwhile conservative movement. They have captured the think tanks, foundations, journals of opinion, talk radio and the Fox television network. Their power over opinion is well illustrated by the exceptional drum-beat for war that reached a crescendo during the weeks before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The American Right has long been accustomed to thinking of the American media as being dominated by the Left. But, with the exception of the late 1960s, nothing from the Left has ever matched the 2003 neoconservative crescendo.

Who are these neoconservatives? Buchanan is blunt in his critique: to him they are "...a cabal that betrayed the good cause of conservatism, because, from the very beginning, they never believed in it. They had another agenda all along." Further, "the neoconservatives are not really conservatives at all. They are impostors and opportunists. They were Leftists in the 1930s, New Deal and Great Society Democrats through the 1960s, and slid to the right and the Republicans after Nixon and Reagan began rolling up forty-nine state landslides."

The content of their ideology is fully at odds with Buchanan's. While Buchanan urges an "enlightened nationalism," the neoconservatives call for a global campaign to "wage democracy"; for an American world hegemony that will prevent the rise of competing powers on even a regional basis; and for a "new American century" while at the same time caring far less about national sovereignty, including that of the United States. One of the driving forces behind this interventionist program is a

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fervent support for Israel, something that would clearly take a back seat in a foreign policy centered on the United States' "own vital interests." To Buchanan, who sees the United States as having been dragged into quarrels that aren't its own, "we have a vital stake in a just peace" between the Israelis and the Palestinians. On what Buchanan sees as the demographic threat to American existence, the neoconservatives are among those who welcome the tidal wave of immigration from Mexico and other non-European sources.

The other issues Buchanan discusses as having great national importance include the following:

- The essence of American conservatism has been its commitment to "individual liberty" (which is something substantially different from the special rights claimed by minorities under the banner of "freedom" during the past half-century). Buchanan sees a serious threat to Americans' personal freedom if instead of removing the root causes of the hatred against the United States the country launches, as it seems to have, into a potentially decades-long struggle with much of the Islamic world. He quotes James Madison, who said "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." The Patriot Act and Department of Homeland Security will serve best if they can be like the old Roman "dictatorship for a year." If they must exist for many years, the danger becomes palpable.
- Buchanan believes the Bush administration has adopted a misdirected strategy in the war with Islamic radicalism. It is much better to comprehend the reasons for hatred against oneself than to take refuge in a gross simplification, denouncing opponents as "evil ones." Reflexive interventions invite the weak to use the only weapon they have – terror. "The war Netanyahu and the neocons want, with the United States and Israel fighting all the radical Islamic states, is the war bin Laden wants." The invasion of Iraq was "the greatest strategic blunder in forty years," taking the focus off of eliminating al Qaeda, substituting an unnecessary war in its place, and exacerbating hatreds.
- Domestically, he sees a decline in American education at all levels; a decline in religion and morality; and an activist judiciary,

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> led by the U.S. Supreme Court, that pursues a revolutionary agenda. "Though seven of the nine sitting justices were nominated by Republican presidents, Republicans have failed to rein in a Supreme Court that is imposing a social, moral, and cultural revolution upon our country." The danger Buchanan sees in this judicial activism is so great that it is a principal reason he favors the reelection of George W. Bush. That may seem incongruous in light of the inability of earlier Republican presidents to fashion a non-activist court, but Buchanan knows that the election of a Democratic president will certainly lead to appointments of yet more activist judges.

His discussion of these many issues causes Buchanan to give extensive background on a number of subjects that are worth knowing about in themselves: the nineteenth century Russian nihilists; the long struggle in Ireland; the "War of Algiers"; the use of "war terror" in the American Civil War and in Allied bombing of civilian targets in World War II; the rise of China; the history of American protectionism; and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Each of these is a history lesson in itself.

Dwight D. Murphey

The Majesty of the Law:
Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor
Random House, 2003

This book by Justice O'Connor will no doubt be enjoyed by many readers as a readable and not very heavy discussion of the United States Supreme Court, highlights of its history and personalities, and personal details about O'Connor's own experiences on the Court as the first woman appointed to it.

At this level, the book must be credited as "recommended reading." It contains a number of worthwhile and instructive elements, such as a history of habeas corpus, of Magna Carta, of the jury system, of the "reporter system" early in the Court's history through which its decisions were published, of the women's movement in the United States, and of

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the role of the privy council in the colonies before the American Revolution.

O'Connor makes a number of valuable suggestions, say, for improving the jury system, such as that jurors should be allowed to take notes and that it shouldn't automatically disqualify a juror to have heard something about the case. She recommends that jurors should be instructed generally about the law applying the case before they hear the testimony, so that they will have a conceptual framework into which to fit the testimony as they hear it. As a lawyer, I have thought for many years that the courts' failure to give jurors such a road map reflected an odd anti-conceptualism, as though ideas don't count. So I am pleased to see her recommendation.

There is a deeper reading of *The Majesty of the Law*, however, that makes the book "recommended reading" for a very different reason. Here, the instruction from the book comes from what it tells us about O'Connor's mental landscape and the role she sees for herself as a justice. Those are things very much worth knowing about and pondering carefully.

She was appointed by President Reagan, and therefore started out presumptively as one of the conservative justices on the Court. An important fact about the Reagan presidency, however, is that he did a number of things that reflected his being "a man of his time" and that weren't on the mark from the ideological standpoint of his most fervent supporters. One of these was his desire "to be the first to appoint a woman to the Court," even though O'Connor lacked exemplary credentials (having been a trial judge and then a judge on a lower state appellate court).

The fact that stands out most prominently from the book for those who read it more contemplatively is that O'Connor is thoroughly imbued with the worldview that today permeates the educated elite in the United States. Her outlook is a comfortable one, suiting her to a pleasant life on the Court. She is "politically correct" in her support for an egalitarian make-over of American society even if that runs counter to overwhelming public sentiment; she talks much of "democracy" and "democratic process," but it is the democracy of the egalitarian model and not of law and government's being responsive to the existing public

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will; her heroes in the history of the Court are the justices who led the Court away from the old classical liberal construction; she sees Americans as having more freedoms now than they had in the past; and she is enthusiastic about making the United States the leader in "shaping the world" in the image of contemporary American social egalitarianism.

What is surprising is that O'Connor never gives a moment's thought to what the specifically *constitutional* basis for incorporating that worldview into the United States' foundational document may be. Others will ask: What business does she have, as a Justice on the United States Supreme Court, to make that vision "the law of the land"? Where does she obtain that power as a judge?

Contemporary American legal "activists" have long argued that the justices of the nineteenth century were illegitimate "activists" when they incorporated a classical liberal reading into the Constitution. Two observations about this come to mind. There are those who would ask whether it was truly "activist" to have construed the Constitution in light of the philosophy that prevailed at the time the Constitution was written and during the first century of the country's existence. There is no doubt that the broad mandates (of the Bill of Rights in particular) need construing. At one time it was common to suggest that a construction in keeping with the original mindset would not be a usurpation and, as such, would not require amendment through the amendatory process that is set out in the Constitution itself. Such a construction would voice the "original intent" (at least in a broad sense as distinguished from a narrow reading).

The second thought is that there is some disconnect if one is to say that the nineteenth century classical liberal interpretation was illegitimate activism on the ground that "it read Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics* into the Constitution," while the person at the same time says that an incorporation of the current egalitarian project is, as O'Connor argues, a wholesome "democratic process" pursuant to "the Rule of Law." If it is usurpation to invest the Constitution with a social philosophy in the one case, why is it not usurpation to invest it with a much latter social philosophy in the other?

The reality, of course, is that the Supreme Court of the United

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States has fashioned itself into a permanently sitting Constitutional convention. Nine lifetime appointees are given, and readily accept, the role of philosopher kings. The irony is that they do so in the name of "democracy" and the "Rule of Law."

A term has come into use that describes the situation well. It speaks of "totalitarian liberalism." O'Connor and the American governing class are for "democratic process," for "women's and minority rights," and for "diversity," all of which seems to them to fit into benign progress toward a better world; but she is able to speak repeatedly of the need to give "unremitting attention" to "pushing the country" and "changing minds everywhere." She sees the Supreme Court as a "teacher," not merely an applier of established law. In her view, Americans in the past were "separatist" and illiberal; Americans of the present stand in need of an on-going refashioning; and Americans of the future will be admirable because they will have become, in effect, a new and enlightened humanity. The vision is "liberalism" of a sort; the "totalitarian" aspect comes from its being in the tradition of the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks, who demanded the molding of humanity as though people were clay.

One would wish that O'Connor would demonstrate some consciousness of all this. She doesn't. That failure allows her to be well adjusted to the age in which she lives. Self-satisfaction and contentedness are the primary moods of the book.

Dwight D. Murphey

Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror
Richard A. Clarke
Free Press, 2004

Subject only to one important qualification, it would be hard to imagine anyone better positioned than Richard A. Clarke to speak authoritatively on questions relating to the United States' present war with Islamic radicalism. He began his federal service in highly sensitive areas of national security more than thirty years ago and has served under a succession of presidents in positions that have shown a high level of confidence in his ability and character: Under Reagan, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence; under George H. W. Bush,

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he was Assistant Secretary of State of Politico-Military Affairs and a member of the National Security Council staff; under Clinton, he was the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism; and he was continued in that role by George W. Bush until 2003, at which time he was given other responsibilities at the highest level. The confidence reposed in him by presidents of varied political and ideological persuasions has been so substantial and consistent that it would seem incongruous for anyone to attempt to refute what he says in this very candid and articulate book by attacking the man himself. Nor would it be justifiable to brush aside what he says as though it comes from a figure who has been only on the periphery of policy and events. He has been in the inner sanctum of several administrations.

The qualification comes from the fact that Clarke does indeed have certain biases. Without them, the tone of this book would be much more non-partisan, which is what might be expected from a career civil servant who has served a variety of presidents. His book is biting in its criticism of George W. Bush and his team for what has gone wrong in American intelligence and national security. This criticism of Bush wouldn't be lessened in the absence of Clarke's cultural predispositions, but he would assign blame much more heavily upon William Clinton than he does.

He says Clinton was ineffectual in critically important ways. Because of the intense political opposition Clinton experienced during the Lewinsky and other episodes, Clinton was prevented from replacing the FBI director, Louis Freeh, thereby allowing a poorly organized FBI to remain of little value in the struggle against terrorism. And because of his strained relationship with the military, Clinton wasn't able to get the military to conduct commando raids against terrorist targets. It is noteworthy that the blame for this ineffectuality lies, in Clarke's perception, not with Clinton but with Clinton's opponents, whose "bitterness knew no bounds" and who "turned the President's personal problem into a global, public circus for their own political ends."

In effect, Clarke thinks that there could be little good faith in anyone's thinking that Clinton's own conduct disgraced the presidency. The opposition to the President's sexual escapades must have been born out of political opportunism. Neither does he see any incongruity in a man's

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having been elected president (and thus made Commander in Chief) who had been a sworn enemy of the military and a participant in the anti-Vietnam War movement (which, we recall, took its alienation to considerable lengths). The explanation for Clarke's perspective may come when he tells us that "I had been an anti-Vietnam War protester in the 1960s." In this context, we may infer from Clarke's attitudes toward Clinton that Clarke shared at least in part the values of the 1960s counterculture, which embraced both "sexual liberation" and animus toward the military. This produces condonation toward Clinton and anger toward his adversaries.

The fact that Clarke is not entirely even-handed in assigning blame, however, is important only in the context of the matters just mentioned. They are by no means inconsequential, which is why they are mentioned here; but what Clarke says about other matters is of such importance that the focus must necessarily be upon those things. It is with regard to those matters that his strengths – in terms of ability and of the confidence successive presidents have reposed in him – have the most bearing.

The book gives the reader an "insider's account" of a large number of episodes during the past quarter-century, and since no review can do justice to those things it is incumbent upon us to recommend that the book be read in its entirety. For purposes of this review, however, it will suffice to tell certain main points, while necessarily skipping others that are also arguably major:

1. The greatest public attention, of course, has been paid to the fact that Clarke is sharply critical of George W. Bush and his administration. These include what he considers the irrational fixation on Iraq despite evidence pointing to others; the failure to act against al Qaeda before September 11 despite repeated warnings, and against an al Qaeda training camp in Kurdish northern Iraq for as long as 18 months even after September 11; the rush to war while brushing aside allies; the distrust of anything carried over from the Clinton administration or that had a multilateral nature; the search for simple answers, ignoring nuance or subtlety, while engaged in such childishness as crossing off the pictures of terrorists who were caught or killed; the disbanding of

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the Iraqi army in violation of implicit commitments to its personnel; and the slow and meager commitment to the war in Afghanistan.

2. The invasion of Iraq, Clarke argues, was an unnecessary and unjustified tangent that multiplied America's enemies, deflected the United States from the task of eliminating al Qaeda, and sucked away the money needed for homeland security. He enumerates still other costs of the invasion when he says, "With our Army stretched to the breaking point, our international credibility at an all-time low, Muslims further radicalized against us, our relations with key Allies damaged, and our soldiers in a shooting gallery, it is... hard to believe that America is safer...." The invasion, he says, was the product of a fixation on Iraq from the beginning of the George W. Bush administration. There was no evidence of Iraqi cooperation in a terrorist threat to the United States, and no imminent threat from weapons of mass destruction.

3. Little is being done to address the ideological challenge posed by radical Islamism. Unless that is addressed, the number of terrorists won't be finite; they will multiply. Among other things, the United States needs to "force an Israeli-Palestinian settlement." "If we could achieve a Middle East peace much of the popular support for al Qaeda and much of the hatred for America would evaporate overnight."

4. A global consensus against Islamic radicalism is imperative, and the United States must work to improve relations with the Islamic mainstream, with the goal of isolating the militants and depriving them of a mass base. Friendly regimes and forces should be shored up in such places as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and within Iran's democratic opposition.

5. Vast homeland security vulnerabilities need to be addressed – as they have barely begun to be. The government needs to prioritize them and do the essential preparation for their defense (actually an immense job). The vast sum of money needed for this has been drained off by the invasion of Iraq, and "porous borders" continue placing the country at risk.

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6. Clarke is withering in his criticism of both the FBI and the CIA. The FBI has operated through 56 field-office "princedoms," with no modern information technology and insufficient communication within the agency and upward to the top. For its part, the CIA has held information within itself, not sharing it with others who have needed to know it; has had a long history of analytical failures; has been so risk-aversive, because of earlier criticisms, that it has been unable to act; has suffered from a critical inability to plant spies where needed; and, as a bureaucracy, has been unresponsive to what its own Director and even the President have wanted done. Although Clarke himself was the "national coordinator for security and counterterrorism," that position was not an "anti-terrorism czar" with oversight or directive power over the FBI, CIA and other intelligence agencies. He joins "many veteran observers of the intelligence community" in recommending the creation of an independent commission similar to the Federal Reserve Board, with a respected board or directors and "an elite staff," to handle the "intelligence analysis function" that presently resides in the CIA. This appears, however, to differ from the notion of combining all of the intelligence agencies into a single department.

The fact that, as this is written, almost three years have passed since September 11 without additional major successful attacks in the United States would seem a *prima facie* indication that much is in fact being "done right" in the discovery and interdiction of terrorists. Clarke would do well to acknowledge this (although, in common with him, almost no one in American public life today does).

7. Clarke is concerned, as are many others, about the possible destruction of personal liberties that can flow from massive and long-continuing national security efforts. He endorses the creation of a "Civil Liberties and Security Board" composed of people "who inspire trust and confidence from the vast majority of our citizens." He admonishes that it "must be more than just a civilian police complaint committee; it must actively shape the work of the security service to insure that it acts in accordance with... civil rights and civil liberties."

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Afloat in a bewildering array of problems and imperfect solutions, a reader may wonder whether some overarching lessons are not to be learned. Are there certain larger generalizations that suggest themselves as we reflect upon all this?

Someone who is brutally realistic might well say that the tasks that governments at all levels – local, state and national – are called upon to perform to meet the crisis are far beyond their ability to perform. Even if those governments were to perform with the best efficiency achievable, there would still be vast gaps and slippage. Even after reforms are rightly perceived and implemented, so much will remain to be done, and at such expense, that governments at best will offer only an imperfect and porous solution. Moreover, there is little reason to think that "best efficiency" will ever be achieved.

The same brutal realism dictates a realization that there will never be any possibility of creating an assured defense for the countless places at which a large and open society is vulnerable to terrorist attack. The train-station bombings in Madrid and the panic caused by two snipers acting alone illustrate this well. Clarke wants the United States to prioritize its vulnerabilities – and indeed that must be done. But terrorists will still be able to strike in theaters, apartment houses, symphony concerts, at ballgames – wherever people live or gather, or wherever there are utilities or installations serviceable to them.

If both these insights are true, they underscore how vital it is to remove the motivation for others' attacking the United States. In part, Clarke addresses this when he speaks about going to the ideological roots of Islamic radicalism, stresses the need for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, and calls for a broad alliance, which most pertinently would include the Islamic peoples. But it is important to be conscious of the fact that there are unresolved conceptual issues about how to remove the grounds for hatred. Many argue that "they hate us because we are free and prosperous." This suggests that the American people are engaged in a war without end – "perpetual war" – , since there would be no remedy short of giving up freedom and prosperity. One suspects that the explanation is arrived at without much thought. For his part, Clarke raises a second issue when, consistently with today's conventional wisdom in the United States, he argues that "we and our

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values need to be more appealing to Muslims than al Qaeda is." This assumes that "our values" are such that they must (when rightly perceived) be acceptable to peoples of very different cultures, institutions, and history. The trouble is, as Samuel Huntington has pointed out, that that just isn't so.

It seems consistent with "human nature" that others wish to be left alone, and take offense at those who presume to order their affairs. A public discussion of "going to the root causes of the hatred" might do well to include the question of whether American policy prior to 1898 was not the wiser course. Under that policy, the United States was to be an exemplar of a free society, but was not to intervene around the world even for the best of causes. Americans may be setting a quixotic course if they try to persuade the entire world that their values are the best. If they content themselves to let other peoples decide that for themselves, Americans may thereby remove much of the reason for fear and resentment. Clarke doesn't think in such broad terms, but the paradoxes his book poses invite that sort of reflection.

Dwight D. Murphey

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Boundaries and Belonging:
States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices
Ed. Joel S. Migdal
Cambridge University Press, 2004

With the growing complexity of society few people still live in a world that comprises only their own kind and their own set of cultural values and customs. Indeed, although the term "nation state" continues to be used, quite misleadingly in most cases, the customary situation today is for the borders of any one state to include a variety of often quite different peoples and value-systems. Sometimes this is a situation created by imperialism, either historic or recent, and in others it is due to migration across state boundaries, but in all such cases we find that people no longer identify solely with the state in which they live.

People do not seem to feel psychologically satisfied unless they "know who they are." It is not enough for humans to be an unidentifiable part of a larger, formless society. If they belong to a nation state, that is to say if they can identify with their own kind of people whom they can see clearly as forming a distinctive society within the greater world this is often sufficient satisfaction. But when the society in which they live is not homogeneous, then they will seek to identify with their own cultural or ethnic element. Always, in such a situation, there is the desire to identify with a distinctive and recognizable subset, which will be either a minority within the state, a majority in that state, or else a transnational group whose members reside in one or more different political states, but with whom they may feel a stronger bond than with the other residents of the state to which they themselves at least nominally belong. This psychological urge is likely to be strongly supported by the obvious political and often economic advantages of having allies, rather than being a faceless and helpless individual in an alien and unsympathetic world.

This book has grown out of two workshops held at the University of Washington in 2002. It comprises a collection of multidisciplinary papers by some fourteen scholars drawn from diverse countries, but all focus in one way or another, as the subtitle implies, on the struggle by humans to acquire a specific identity, and on the ways in which members of diverse

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ethnic and social groups maintain their sense of ethnic identity in a political state other than a nation state. How do individuals, and minority ethnic groups especially, survive in a multi-cultural society?

As the editor observes in the introduction, the old European empires have disappeared and decolonisation is now complete, but remarkably few political borders have changed. Few scholars have addressed the cultural and political meaning attached to these boundaries, which often have less than expected ethnic justification. There has been little interest in, as he puts it, "what kind of meaning, or sense of belonging, borders created for people, as they tried to place themselves socially in the world." However, in the 1990s, the breakup of the Soviet Union, which had kept many ethnically diverse peoples in human bondage within a single politically-defined set of boundaries, created a situation where peoples struggled against each other in the desire to live amongst their own kind within their own borders. Yugoslavia is a case in point. Here we saw an artificial state, containing not only Moslem Albanians but Eastern Orthodox Christian Serbs and Roman Catholic Christian Croats, who had been held together within a single political state under Communist dictatorship. Once the central government lost power, the component elements, Slovenes, Croats, Muslim Bosnians and Muslim Albanians, and Eastern Orthodox Serbs all sought autonomy in their own territories. Human behavior still echoes Robert Ardrey's "territorial imperative," and indeed any people who wish to ensure that they will be followed by future generations of their own kind do truly need a distinctive breeding ground, otherwise their distinctive genetic character is unlikely to survive into future generations in recognizable form.

But those who govern political states that embrace more than one ethnic group seldom like to see the boundaries of any existing state challenged. Wishing to see their own area of influence undiminished, changes of borders anywhere in the world leave them feeling uneasy, and they are prone to intervene to preserve existing political boundaries, arguing that they oppose "ethnic cleansing" and resisting any trend toward the formation of ethnically homogenous states. What happens is history – though a history which is ongoing.

The editor points out that although the book is concerned with

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boundaries, it is primarily interested in the formation of conceptual boundaries within existing political states. He cites the example of the paper on Israel by Deborah Bernstein, which shows how in the state of Israel the real human boundary is between Jew and Arab. Boundaries, he points out, can be divided into two types, checkpoints and mental maps. Check points are purely a matter of political control, but mental maps are the boundaries that people live by.

Resat Kasaba, from the Bogaziki University of Istanbul, and Sarah Abrevaya Stein of the University of Washington both provide papers on the Ottoman Empire, which incorporated a wide variety of different peoples and even religions. We think of this empire as one united by religion; but being interested primarily in retaining their power, the Ottoman rulers allowed the many diverse national and ethnic groups to live each in its own way – provided they did not attempt to win independence.

Lauren Basson of the University of Beer Sheva in Israel compares three different concepts, namely citizenship, nationality, and ethnicity, which sociologists and political theorists too infrequently distinguish. Examining multi-ethnic America at the turn of the eighteenth-nineteenth centuries, she throws light on the problematic appearance of "mixed bloods" in a society comprising different races living side by side. The United States, she explains, was at that time regarded as a white nation, and in the popular mind "full-blooded Indians were not a part of the American nation," whereas "mixed bloods," or "half-breeds" as they were then called, "did not have the right to exist."

Her paper contrasts with the contribution by Nicholas F. Watts, of San Francisco State College, whose paper is entitled "Institutionalizing Virtual Kurdistan West." This deals with the plight of the Kurds living within the borders of the Turkish state, and nicely shows how the members of an ethnically distinct nation, who had been subjected to Turkish imperialism but who, despite sharing a common religion with the politically dominant Turks, had managed to retain their sense of separate group identity. The Kurdish nation has not enjoyed self-rule within its age-old geographical boundaries for a thousand years, and is today remains divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The Turkish government, ruling over a substantial part of the Kurdish

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nation, has even prohibited the teaching of the Kurdish language to Kurdish schoolchildren but has not succeeded in eliminating the Kurdish sense of nationhood.

Mary P. Callahan of the Jackson School of International Studies in Washington selects Myanmar (Burma) for her study. Here she shows clearly the attempts of a central government located in Rangoon to suppress the diverse ethnic communities that fall within the political boundaries of this multi-ethnic state. In particular the Mon who live in the Eastern highlands of Burma, and whose ancestors probably lived in Burma long before the Burmese ever drove them out of the richer lands to their West, have long sought to regain the degree of freedom they enjoyed under British colonial rule, but no longer enjoy under Burmese rule. The Rangoon government even regards the survival of the Mon language to be a threat to their authority, and far from allowing autonomy to the Mon people they have waged a decades-long war against them to preserve the borders of the culturally and ethnically diverse state over which they claim authority. The United Nations, heavily dominated by those who rule other multi-ethnic states around the world, makes no demand for self-rule for the Mon, but is concerned only with defending the integrity of the existing borders of the Burmese state, which is in effect a tyrannical empire.

In a very different vein, Matthew Sparke presents a revealing paper on "Passports into Credit Cards" which reveals his commitment to what he calls the "neoliberal" ideal. This is not about how peoples of transnational ethnic groups collect a variety of different passports from countries which are not nation-states and therefore see no incongruity in granting passports to individuals who already claim to be citizens of other countries. It is not about persons who see a national passport not as an entitlement of birth, but more like a credit card, to be acquired at will and used as the situation requires. Multiple passport holders exist in increasing numbers, but Sparke is talking about how transnational organizations are advocating the use of *real* credit cards, to replace national passports, across national borders, The neoliberal global world view places more importance on credit cards than on passports. He questions the wisdom of those who argue that the world should be "thinking of other kinds of transnational citizenship that move beyond

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the credit card model, forms of political, and perhaps one day, even social citizenship that create freedom of movement for everyone irrespective of whether they prequalify [a touch of very human sarcasm here] for platinum, gold class or other red-carpet, VIP fast-capitalist privileges."

Neil Diamont, of the Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, discusses "Boundaries and Belonging in Extreme Cases of Politicization." Selecting China as an example of a despotic state, he discusses how "French, Russian and Chinese revolutionaries dealt with marriage and the family." The rulers of states who seek to gain total control realize that it is the family and kin group that has the greatest potential power to resist dictatorship, and revolutionaries generally seek to restrict family and kinship ties.

Adriana Kemp of Tel Aviv University presents a paper entitled "Dangerous Populations: State Territoriality and the Constitution of National Minorities" in which she shows how national minorities trapped within a larger political state can be regarded as a potential threat to be kept in submission. She sees the Palestinians within the borders of Israel in that light, and states that some Israelis actually refer to them as the "inner enemies." Modern states, she writes, are often "built from the centers outward" and minority groups entrapped within the borders are subjected to an "intensification of state power." Unfortunately, she is not totally clear-thinking, for she more than once refers to such multi-ethnic states as "nation states," even when they are engaged in suppressing all sense of national or ethnic identity. However, this is the only paper in this volume that falls into the outdated practice of referring to multi-ethnic political states as a "nation states." A century ago there were still very many true nation states, and scholars never attempted to call a heterogeneous political entity such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire a "nation state." Even Adriana Kemp, although anxious to highlight the tensions that exist within multi-ethnic political states, alone amongst the contributors fails to see how anachronistic it is to refer to such entities as nation states.

In general it may be said that while the authors condemn the government of multi-ethnic states for endeavoring to frustrate the natural desire of individuals to search for identity, and correctly draw the

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reader's attention to the fact that most modern states are a conglomerate of diverse cultural and ethnic components, they are not advocating a return to ethnically homogeneous nation states. Instead they see a world society composed of individuals who, no longer so easily able to identify with the increasingly amorphous and hetero-cultural political states of the modern world, are increasingly prone to seek their identity in terms of the specific ethnic or religious group to which they belong.

James Jamieson

Restructuring Post-Communist Russia
Ed.s Yitzhak Brudny, Jonathan Frankel, Stefan Hoffman
Cambridge University Press, 2004

Since 1991, when the Soviet Union finally collapsed, the world has watched events breathlessly in an effort to discern the future of Russia. This latest Cambridge University Press publication, competently edited by three scholars from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, presents twelve informative and well-organized papers by the similar number of scholars drawn from different countries. These papers provide us with a wealth of insight into the social and economic changes that took place in the USSR under Yeltsin and, more recently, in the post-socialist period. Thus they cover the break-up of the monolithic Soviet Empire and the subsequent tension between federalism and tangential forces, attempts at the formation of a multi-party political system, the search for a post-socialist national identity, and above all, the problems and goals facing Russian leaders, notably its current leader, Putin.

Analyzing the recent past, the contributors also speculate on future developments. Some authors such as Valerie Bunce, Alexander Motyl, and Anatoly M. Khazanov are skeptical of current economic progress, but a close look at the recent history of Ukraine leads Ilya Prizel to the conclusion that improvements in the efficacy of the Russian state and society are, by comparison, progressing well.

Marshall I. Goldman and Theodore H. Friedgut assess the massive upheavals that have transformed the Russian economy and society since 1991, and Vera Tolz traces the attempts made by politicians and intellectuals to define a new national identity for the Russian people.

The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies

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Political conditions – the parties, the electoral system and results, and the complexities of the federal system – are described and analyzed in detail by prominent Russian scholars such as Andrey Ryabov, Nikolai V. Petrov, and Oksana Oracheva. As for Russian foreign policy, Rajan Menon argues that the country's rapprochement with the United States is likely to be relatively permanent, given the threat to Russia from China and the Moslem world.

Modern Russia sees itself as an independent Eurasian power, bent on rebuilding itself after its disastrous experiment with Marxism, while seeking to avoid the decadence that permeates Western Europe. Its prime quality mineral resources, the source of future wealth, lie in Siberia, but here its weakness is its thin population, which is declining rather than expanding, while its neighbor to the East, China, has a vast surplus of population which continues to expand. Thus, one contributor warns of the flood of Chinese who are entering the eastern Maritime Region of Siberia, and this reviewer has also recently noted reports of Chinese investment and Chinese laborers moving into Kazakhstan to initiate the new agricultural enterprises so necessary to feed the billion-plus mouths of China. The Chinese tend to come as workers, but stay on as settlers. Because Russia, despite its high unemployment, is increasingly short of people to develop its resources, some inside Russia have advocated the import of immigrant labor from China and India. But throughout its history, Russia has experienced the threat of invasion from the East, and strong xenophobic sentiments persist which are unlikely to welcome any such influx of immigrants, especially "visible minorities," into Russia proper. But Russia's wealth lies in Siberia, which is the area that is most valued by China.

Reference is made to an article in *The Russian Journal* on August 24, 2001, by Andrei Piontkovskii, which "pointed to demographic decline as the root cause of a process that could lead to Russia's leaving the Far East, and even Siberia, first *de facto*, and later *de jure*." Another observer is quoted as saying, in a broader context, that "Historically, societies that sustained population growth have conquered or otherwise absorbed their less-populous neighbors. East Siberia and the Far East have only two things between them and absorption by China: the Russian nuclear deterrent and their bad climate." [NIC Seminar 2000,"A

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Case Study: The Far East"]

The demographic problem is taken very seriously: "However far-fetched this may seem, the problem of the depopulation of these areas is real, as is the inability thus far of the Russian government, whether central or regional, to provide reasonable living conditions, including both an economic and social infrastructure, for the citizens of these regions. Lacking such policies, the danger of the 'implosion of Russia,' involving the potential loss of valuable resources and large territories, particularly under the pressure of Chinese immigration in the Far East, must become a very palpable anxiety for Russia's leaders." [p.147]

Looking even more broadly than the Russian context, we know that the survival of the nations of Western Europe, as historic European entities, is currently threatened by the demographic pressure of rising, uninvited, mass immigration from an exploding Third World population, which in some cases has already reached seemingly irreversible dimensions (roughly 10% of the population of France is already of Moslem immigrant origin). The future of the West European countries is hard to forecast, but it is remotely possible that a currently impoverished Russia, struggling to recover from the environmental, educational and genetic destruction perpetrated by seventy years of Soviet communist mismanagement, may yet survive as a distinctly European country, while the nations of the West become increasingly Afro-Asiatic. This presently improbable outcome will depend on whether Russia can produce the home-grown technocrats to develop its mineral resources, and succeed in reversing its current population decline. If it fails to do this, its valuable Siberian territories may eventually be inundated by immigrants from overpopulated Eastern Asia, seeking to expand westwards, no matter how cold and unattractive much of that land might be.

Ian McNish

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The European Union, Mercosul and the New World Order
Editors: Helio Jaguaribe & Alvaro de Vasconcelos
Frank Cass, London, 2003

This volume is edited by two academics, one from Rio de Janeiro and the other from Lisbon. It comprises papers by six South American and five European scholars which focus on trends in the recent history of the European Union and Mercosul. The authors discuss the problems of regional integration, the way in which these two multinational organizations interrelate with other supra-national organizations and what this may portend for the future of the "World Order." In particular they discuss the problems of regional integration, and some touch upon the disparate experiences of these two organizations.

The European Union and Mercosul both represent attempts at regional integration that work with raw material that is very different. In South America, Brazil is a giant compared with other member countries. Geographically, Brazil covers more than 8 million square kilometers, and has a population of 172 million (almost as large as the total population of Germany, France and Britain combined), thereby dwarfing the other member states of Mercusol in both territorial size and population. Sao Paulo, with a population of over 18 million, is the third largest city in the world. The next largest member state of Mercosul is Argentina, which has 2.7 million square kilometers, but only 37 million population. Historically, Portuguese-speaking Brazil has an ethnically very diverse population, with the bulk of the lower echelons being descended from African slaves and, to a less extent, American Indians, but with an upper economic strata of primarily white origin. By contrast, Spanish-speaking Argentina lays claim to a more European-oriented origin and culture. Brazil's economy (at $500 billion) is twice that of Argentina, although its GDP per head is much smaller. Both have problems with inflation.

While there are only two languages spoken in the Mercosul countries (Spanish and Portuguese), the European Union is made up of countries speaking many different languages, but dominated by the relatively healthy economies of Germany, France and Britain. It hopes to eventually eliminate poverty in the more backward member countries.

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Slovakia, for example, has a smaller GDP than Malaysia, and has largely eliminated barriers to the movement of capital and people. In short, it is more advanced along the road to economic and political union than the Mercosul countries, which have presently no real plan to unite as a single entity – something that has strong advocates, for better or for worse, in the European Union. With 82 million inhabitants, Germany, although the largest of the European Union member countries, still has less than half the population of Brazil, but its economy is three and a half times that of Brazil, despite the fact that it has few natural resources and a land area of only 357 thousand square kilometers.

From an overview of the above, we would have hoped from the title of this book that the authors would have made more specific comparisons between the two systems, but unfortunately that is not the case. In general, the contributors focus on the Mercosul countries, and it is in the discussion of these that the merits of this publication are to be found. Apart from some perfunctory discussion of the relationship between the EU and Mercosul, the focus is almost entirely devoted to Mercosul, its aspirations and problems, and to relations with the World Trade Organizations, NAFTA and other international bodies.

While the EU has recently absorbed new member countries, the authors generally believe that further integration of Mercosul is not imminent, and there is an erosion of optimism amongst its proponents. Globalism, as Carlos Perez Llama points out, equals the loss of sovereignty, and the member South American governments do not seem to share the enthusiasm for this that appears to characterize those officials of the European Union who are currently driving for greater European political centralization and integration. What will happen within the European Union following the accession of the latest group of relatively poor member countries from Central Europe is not discussed. Nor is there any speculation as to what will happen to the EU if it agrees to admit Turkey, with its traditionally high inflation rates (45% in 2001-02), its Moslem population of 67 million (larger than the population of either Britain or France), and a fertility rate of 2.4, compared with Latvia's 1.1, Italy's 1.23, Austria's 1.28, Germany's 1.35, or even Britain's 1.6.

Carol Perez Llana believes that Mercosul has a better future than

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the European Union as a sub-regional entity, because (1) the multipolar system has inherent benefits over the EU's attempt to centralize power, (2) Europe suffers from a declining birthrate and a correspondingly aging population, in sharp contrast to the member states within Mercosul (although it is not at all sure that despite the vast uninhabited territories within Mercosul that are available for development, the population of Mercosul countries is not expanding more rapidly than the economy can support), and (3) unlike the EU, Mercosul has to deal with only two languages, one of which, Spanish, is likely to retain its global importance, even as the number of internationally-spoken languages steadily shrinks.

On the other hand, in their concluding chapter, the two editors express the opinion that the European Union will continue to expand and will become a formidable economic and political power. They do not seem to anticipate any serious problems as a result of its seeming interest in expanding even beyond Europe. By contrast, it is their opinion that Mercosul will remain hampered by systemic deficits in the balance of payments of its member countries and is in danger of being reduced to satellite status by the United States. Indeed, they even condemn Argentina "as being contaminated by its ruling strata" which has accepted "neoliberal economic policies" from the United States and the international financial system which they assert is "controlled by the U.S.". Although such statements reveal the editors' personal interests rather clearly, the papers contained in this volume reflect a wide range of viewpoints and are not subjected to any ideological guidelines that might reflect the convictions of the editors.

Jonathan G. Smart

Markets in Historical Contexts:
Ideas and Politics in the Modern World
Edited by Mark Bevir and Frank Trentmann
Cambridge University Press, 2004

Markets in Historical Contexts is the result of a dialogue between historians and social scientists on possible manipulation of the prevailing economic systems in a post-socialist world. Editor Mark Bevir is an

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Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and his co-author Frank Trentmann is Senior Lecturer in Modern History at Birkbeck College, University of London.

The various papers they present are linked in a pattern that is intended to provide insight into the extent to which modern market systems in a post-Marxist world can be manipulated to serve specific social goals. Seeking to explore what alternative ways there might be in thinking about markets other than those suggested by past theorists, the contributors tend to disregard economic forces as something that have a built-in causal system of their own, and search for ways of marrying social goals to market systems. Thus the essays set out to challenge essentialist accounts of the market, and instead suggest that markets are always embedded in cultural traditions that shape the ways in which they are conceived and the manner of their working. The essays range widely over European and non-European societies from the eighteenth century to the present age of globalization.

Rational peasants, republican economists, popular conservatives, guild theorists, early environmentalists, communitarians, progressives, and even the thoughts of Gandhi are all discussed, in a search to find new ways of achieving social goals through economic organization. While the orientation of the writers is activist, the historical papers which discuss the development of markets in nineteenth century Britain, France and Germany are of interest. The thoughts of theorists such as Rousseau, Toennies and Ruskin are brought back into focus, and Rob Jenkins' paper on economic reform in India (which has not evolved in the way that either Gandhi or the London School of Economics socialism of the early Congress Party would have wished) is of similar historical interest. This is not an earth-shaking book, but it represents an attempt to move away from narrowly objective economic analysis to economics as a tool for socio-political ideologues, and can be read with interest both by those who share such goals and those who regard them as anathema.

Jonathan G. Smart

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BASF: The History of A Company
Werner Abelhauser, Wolfgang von Hippel, Jeffrey Allan Johnson, and Raymond G. Stokes.
Cambridge University Press, 2004.

This is an in-depth study of a major German industrial and commercial complex by cooperating authors from the Universities of Mannheim, Villanova and Glasgow, respectively. As the dust jacket informs us, the corporate history of BASF spans an era of German and international economic history that began with the rise of "new industries" as a newly united Germany industrialized in the late nineteenth century and continues today in their confrontation with what is described as the "new economy" – the international market.

The authors examine BASF's corporate governance, financial system, industrial relations, and relation to other companies. Unfortunately it was completed too soon to tell us how BASF is coping in this current year with the present malaise in a Germany that faces competition from China and other Asian nations. Modern Germany is handicapped by a socialist welfare system that is aggravated by growing interference from the European Union – which comprises a new level of governmental controls superimposed on the existing national bureaucracies of Europe. However, this history of BASF is more than an insight into the functioning of an industrial organization over time: it reveals the reasons for the economic dynamics of Germany under the Kaisers, the enormous expansion of world trade before World War I, and the role of BASF at the center of Germany's wartime economy during both world wars. In the words of the publishers:

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As economic history this study also has real meaning for economic theorists.

Jonathan G. Smart

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The Great Sex Divide



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

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THE INDO-EUROPEANS



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